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Abstract
In order to be properly applied, criminal law must determine what conduct warrants
punitive  action.  Figuring  out  exactly how one must  act  to  be  criminally liable  is  a
difficulty that faces any legal system. In many jurisdictions  criminal  recklessness is
regarded as an important notion for liability. However, recklessness is difficult to define,
and attempts at this exercise have been a problem in legal philosophy since the mid-
twentieth century, and persist today (Crosby 2008). This thesis discusses accounts of
recklessness with the aim of defining it in a way that overcomes several problems which
have arisen in recent legal history. It is widely accepted, as well as prima facie intuitive,
that people can be culpable for acts committed recklessly. Despite this, whether or not a
state of mind is reckless is difficult to define, let alone define in a way that is not only
conceptually sound, but also pragmatically apt.
Recklessness occurs when an agent engages in some risky activity, but factors like
the agent’s attitude and whether the risk is foreseen have been cited as relevant when
ascertaining  their  recklessness.  I  discuss  some  difficulties  in  legally  framing
recklessness,  before  criticising  some  definitional  manoeuvres  made  by  judges  and
scholars in the past. With some problems in previous accounts noted, I consider the
foundations of culpability in general. I suggest that two accounts of culpability – the
agency theory and the  choice  theory –  are  both plausible,  and each correlates  to  a
prominent contemporary position on recklessness (and criminal law in general). After
serious  consideration  of  both  positions,  I  conclude  that  the  position  advocated  by
Antony Duff, which I see as in keeping with the agency theory of culpability, is both
more generally useful  for criminal  law and much more coherent  with our  everyday
practices of blaming and punishing. 
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I. Introduction 
1. Introduction to recklessness in law
From the mid-twentieth century, there has been controversy in legal philosophy over
how recklessness should be defined. It is generally acknowledged that a person who acts
recklessly  can  be  culpable  for  their  crimes.  One  can  be  blameworthy  for  acting
recklessly. Moreover, one can appropriately be punished for acting recklessly. However,
without a sophisticated account of recklessness, this can be very problematic, as was
demonstrated through a continuing saga played out in English law1. 
In the following, I will, for the most part, limit the discussion to the laws of the USA
and England and Wales, though much of it will be applicable elsewhere. Just what level
of culpability attaches to a particular act of wrongdoing, and what level of culpability
should be required for conviction of a crime, are pertinent questions for any community.
In  the  United  States,  the  Model  Penal  Code  (MPC)  distinguishes  four  “kinds  of
culpability”2:  
1. Purposely
2. Knowingly
3. Recklessly
4. Negligently
1 By ‘English law’, I refer to the law of England and Wales, but only because I know of no handy 
nomenclature for ‘England and Wales’.
2 Model Penal Code: §2.02. It should be noted that the MPC is not a binding legal document: it is, as its 
name indicates, only a model. It is seen only seen as a blueprint for legal framework in the US and has 
had, according to Dressler, more impact on the direction of American criminal law than any other 
document (Dressler 1995: p.120). It is also praised for giving legal distinctions a much greater clarity than
had existed before its creation (Alexander and Ferzan 2009: p.24).
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An offence committed purposely is one wherein the offence isn’t merely an accepted
consequence of the agent’s behaviour, but actually what the agent is trying to do; the
agent  acts  with  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  the  illegal  consequence.  Offences
knowingly committed, by contrast take place when an agent realises that his action is
practically certain to bring about or involve an offence, but does it anyway. Consider
two agents who take a shortcut across a neighbour’s garden, in which there are many
flowers and signposts informing of their fragility3. The first agent cuts across the garden
because  the  neighbour  annoys  her  and  she  wants  to  ruin  his  flowers.  The  second,
realises that the flowers will be damaged, but walks across the garden because she is in
a rush. Both cause the same damage, but the first does so purposefully, whereas the
second does so merely knowingly. 
Recklessness doesn’t require an agent to be certain that a certain material element
exists or will exist from their conduct. According to the MPC, it requires that the risk
the  agent  disregards  is  “substantial  and  unjustifiable,”4 and  this  disregarding  must
involve “a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe”5.   Recklessness is typically characterised as a willingness to take risks, while
having some disregard for consequences of one’s actions6. Some judges and authors on
the subject have suggested that the legal definition tracks the everyday usage of the
term, and it is merely the proper analysis  of normal use that should guide the legal
3 Antony Duff provides an example similar to this in “Intention, Responsibility and Double Effect” 
(1982a: p.1). 
4 Model Penal Code: §2.02 (c). Even this loose definition is criticised. Larry Alexander argues that the 
“substantial” factor is inappropriate, as an agent could be culpable and justly subject to legal punishment 
for taking a very small risk, particularly if it is a small risk of a great harm (Alexander 2011: p.226, 
Alexander and Ferzan 2009: pp.25-7). Kimberly Kessler Ferzan also criticises the requirement for 
conscious disregarding of the risk, as is discussed in chapter V (2001: p.598). 
5 Baron (2001: 26, n.9) has suggested that the comparison of one’s conduct to that of a “law-abiding 
person” is problematic, as it is uninformative at best. She expresses a preference for “reasonable person” 
in such cases. 
6 As in Cunningham ([1957] All E.R. 412) “not caring what the result might be”.
8
definition7. Negligence, in criminal law, takes place when an agent is not aware of some
risk  resulting  from their  conduct,  but  should  be aware  and  the  agent’s  “failure  to
perceive  it…involves  a  gross  deviation  from the  standard  of  care  that  a  reasonable
person would observe in the actor’s situation”8.
With regard to the law in England and Wales, similar requirements were held to be
necessary in A Criminal Code for England and Wales (henceforth 1989 Code)9, holding
that  with  the  exception  of  certain  specified  offences  (“pre-Code”  offences),  “every
offence  requires  a  fault  element”  (1989  Code,  20(1)).  In  the  1989  Code,  however,
recklessness is the lowest degree of fault, not negligence, which (generally speaking)
does not satisfy the fault requirement in English law. There are exceptions to this, some
of which will be mentioned later. There is considerable debate about whether or not
negligence should suffice for criminal culpability, or put differently, should satisfy the
mens rea requirement. 
The paradigm cases of most crimes fit the first or second categories, as the agent
knows they are  committing  the  crime.  These  are  the  most  serious  instances  of  the
offences (Duff 1990: p.10). Whether there is a genuine moral difference in resulting
blame between  offences  committed  purposely and  knowingly  (those  which  are  just
foreseen)  is  a common discussion in ethics;  the doctrine of double effect  (as in  the
flower  stomper  case  above,  and  many  far  more  serious  examples)10.  Though  those
7 For example, Lord Diplock describes ‘recklessness’ as an “ordinary English word” and treats it 
accordingly in Caldwell ([1982] A.C. 341) and White analyses ordinary concepts similarly (1961: p.594, 
1985: p.106).
8 Model Penal Code §2.02 (d).
9 A codified document for criminal law was never established in England (though discussions about 
producing one continue), but having been produced originally by academic lawyers as the “1985 Draft 
Criminal Code for English Law” and published as Codification of the Criminal Law (1985 Code) and 
revised by the law commission for the 1989 Code, it seems fair to suggest that it is (or at least was, at the 
time) a fair reflection of most criminal law in England and Wales. 
10 The doctrine of double effect discussed both in relation to legal philosophy (as in Duff 1982a) and 
much wider moral questions (Kamm 1991 and many others). 
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committed purposely and knowingly are the most serious instances of offences, reckless
behaviour  also  warrants  censure.  Whether  or  not  an  agent  should  be  punished  for
negligent behaviour, when not aware of the risks she creates, is a divisive issue and will
be discussed at length later.
That we deem reckless acts not only blameworthy but also deserving of criminal
conviction can be demonstrated by considering examples of some serious offences with
recklessness as the mens rea element.
The paradigm examples of rape and murder involve knowing that the victim is not
consenting and knowing that the victim will be killed respectively. However, the man
who has sex with a non-consenting woman, while unsure whether or not she consents
not deeming it important to find out, but who continues anyway – who is reckless with
regards to her consent – is still generally accepted to have committed a rape. 
2. Three questions of recklessness
Before going any further,  I  would like to discuss three related questions relevant to
discussions of recklessness. Sometimes in various literature (and case files), it is unclear
which of these questions is being answered and it is far from clear that the answers to
these questions are the same. The first question is of conceptual analysis. What does
recklessness  as  a  concept  actually  involve?  As  in  the  case  of  knowledge,  where
conceptual  analysis  has  operated  rigorously  for  many  years,  we  may  search  for
necessary and sufficient conditions for recklessness, or it may be deemed that finding a
definition of that sort isn’t possible11. I will suggest that Lord Diplock sometimes seems
to try to answer this question in his accounts of recklessness. Norrie also seems to ask
this question when concluding that recklessness is indeterminate, and that there is no
coherent concept that the law and surrounding literature suggests (Norrie 1992: p. 46)12.
11 As held in the case of knowledge by Zagzebski (1994).
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The second question is what should suffice for criminal responsibility.  This isn’t
necessarily  linked  to  recklessness,  but  as  recklessness  is  the  default  minimum
requirement for criminal liability in the US, England and Scotland13, it often becomes
relevant14. It is generally held that negligence should not be sufficient for an agent to be
convicted of certain crimes, as there are worries that merely not paying enough attention
isn’t enough to make someone an arsonist or a rapist15. Where this boundary should be
drawn is  a  critical  question,  as  its  answer will  determine  what  separates  an agent’s
conviction and acquittal.
The third question is how the law should best account for or define recklessness.
This  question is  separate  from the previous  questions,  as it  doesn’t  presuppose that
recklessness is the minimal requirement for one to be generally criminally responsible
and it also allows for pragmatic concerns to be taken into consideration. Even if we did
believe that recklessness was a concept we could formalise very accurately, it might be
the case that applying this is too difficult in certain instances. The account might be too
complicated for a jury to properly understand, let alone apply. Pragmatic concerns may
lead  us  to  adopt  a  specific  legal  definition,  distinct  from  the  type  of  account  a
philosopher  may  be  disposed  to  give16.  Alternatively,  to  properly  judge  whether
12 This is his reaction to Duff’s analysis of recklessness. He suggests that when properly dissected, what 
seem to be the components of recklessness leave an incomplete and unworkable definition. He claims that
the combination of subjective and objective elements it requires (to be discussed later) entail a “logical 
incoherence” (Norrie 1992: p.47). A similar position in epistemology is argued for by Matt Weiner 
(2009). 
13 This is held true in the 1989 Code (as well as its predecessor, a similar attempt in 1985).
14 As noted by David Treiman, recklessness “defines the minimal level of culpability for many 
crimes...thus making the difference between acquittal and conviction” (1981: p.285). 
15 Duff notes a worry by Lord Edmund Davies that if negligence was sufficient for rape, a negligent man 
“could be a rapist per incuriam”, and mere lack of care seems inappropriate as the fault element in such a 
severe crime (Duff 1981: p.52, discussing Lord Edmund’s comments in Morgan, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 947.)
16 This difference of philosophical and legal interests resulting in different solutions is considered in part 
by Glanville Williams (1982: p.286).
11
someone has acted recklessly, it might be thought that a jury would need information
about which an agent might not be forthcoming, or perhaps might no longer be properly
aware of, so finding an agent to be reckless beyond reasonable doubt might seem to be
too high an evidentiary burden. 
I do not intend to address these questions specifically to begin with, but keeping
these distinctions in mind will be useful. I shall return to the individual questions in the
later chapters, intending to consider whether significantly different solutions do seem
appropriate  and  whether  some  authors  on  the  subject  have  allowed  the  different
questions to affect their solutions.
3. Importance of mens rea elements and their definitions
If it is accepted that recklessness suffices for criminal culpability with regards to (at
least) some offences, it might be wondered why the boundary between acts committed
knowingly and recklessly is so important, if both are culpable anyway. One might even
question why the mens rea should be relevant at all. One might query the relevance of
the state of mind of an agent. 
After all, the gunshot victim won’t recover any more quickly (or be more likely to
survive) if the shooter had only hit them by accident. In this section, the relevance of
mens rea elements will be discussed and it will be suggested that different mens rea
elements may warrant different punitive action.
There are some crimes in English law the convictions of which do not require proof
of a mens rea element; the state of mind doesn’t matter for the offence to be established.
An offence which doesn’t need proof of mens rea is called a strict liability offence17. A
strict liability offence doesn’t even require negligence on the part of the agent; they can
have  done everything one  could  reasonably expect  to  prevent  the  consequence  and
would still be guilty of the offence (Duff 2006: p.101). In English law there are a few
17 This is sometimes referred to as “absolute liability” (Turner 1936, Hart 2008).
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strict liability offences, including the sale of adulterated milk (Sale of Food and Drugs
Act 1875) and anyone over the age of 18 having sex with anyone under 13 (Sexual
Offences Act 2003, s.9)18. Why then, should all offences not be treated in this way?
The view that only the actual damages or harms brought about should matter has an
obvious counterpart. A similar argument can be made as to whether the harm matters at
all. If a person fires a rifle several times into a room with several people in, but, through
complete fluke doesn’t hurt anyone, he is clearly guilty of risking the lives of everyone
in that room. It would seem bizarre to suggest that the fortunate end-result of no one
being  injured  should  completely  exonerate  him.  His  firing  the  rifle  seems  morally
equivalent whether or not he is lucky enough to miss the potential victims19. Here, we
might suggest that the action that should be punished is that of putting everyone in the
room in danger, which obviously did take place.
One principle that guides criminal law is that of ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea’,  that  “an act  is  not  guilty unless  the  mind is  also guilty”  (Duff  1990:  p.8).  In
support of this maxim, the general purposes of criminal law might be considered. One
major purpose of criminal law is preventative, either merely as a deterrent or via the
imprisonment of those deemed likely to commit crimes20. This very reason is cited in the
MPC (§1.01). 
Despite this principle, there are arguments for imposing strict liability upon some
actions21.  For my purposes,  however,  let  it  just  be accepted that in  most  cases there
should be a mens rea requirement. As Duff notes, “it is surely unjust to hold someone
18 This was adopted in the 2003 Act. Before this, the 1956 Act held strict liability for men over the age of
24 having sex with women under the age of 16.
19 This seems to be the consensus from theorists in such cases (i.e. Brady 1980: p.246).
20 Ferzan and Alexander claim this is the only function of criminal law (2009: p.3)
21 Ken Simons makes arguments along these lines in “When is Strict Liability Just?” (1997)
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strictly  liable  for  a  criminal  act  he  did  not  commit  intentionally,  recklessly  or
negligently” (Duff 1990: p.9). 
Taking  for  granted  now  that  mens  rea  elements  are  important  when  assessing
culpability,  it  could  still  be  doubted  whether  an  act  committed  knowingly  is  more
culpable than one committed recklessly, or whether one committed recklessly is more
culpable than one committed negligently. Prima facie, it does seem plausible that crimes
committed with an awareness of the risk involved are more blameworthy than those
without. Consider someone throwing knives for fun, and one ricocheting and injuring
someone.  If  the  very same injury was  caused  by a  deliberate  attempt  to  injure  the
victim, it seems intuitive that this is a more serious and culpable crime.
One argument in favour of the degrees of culpability suggested by the MPC is given
by Hyman Gross. He claims that culpability consists of four dimensions; intentionality,
harm,  dangerousness  and  legitimacy  (Gross  1979:  p.77).  The  degree  of  culpability
might be seen as a function of these dimensions22. Gross understands the dangerousness
of act in relation to “reasonable expectations” of what the actor “knows or should know
about the consequences of what he does” (1979: p.79). In this respect, culpability tracks
dangerousness. Gross refers to offences which “leave nothing of the harmful outcome to
chance”  –  those  committed  purposefully  or  knowingly  –  as  imminently  dangerous
(1979: p.85). Reckless behaviour is less dangerous, because it leaves open at least some
chance that the harm will not obtain. As it is less dangerous, it is less culpable. 
It also seems to be notable that someone who harms another recklessly may have
withdrawn were they informed of the actual result just before they did so. Though they
may  have  acted  without  regard  for  the  consequences,  perhaps  –  if  the  negative
consequences had been made blatantly apparent, the agent would have desisted. This
being the case, if we are to examine culpability on a basis of danger towards general
society,  it  seems obvious that the person prevented from the dangerous act by some
clear  warning  is  much  less  dangerous  than  the  one  who  would  go  along  with  it
regardless.
22 Alexander and Ferzan (2009) treat culpability as a function in a similar way, but with only two 
components: the risk imposed and justification for the risk. This account of culpability is discussed at 
length in chapter V.
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II. History of recklessness in Law
In this section, the history of recklessness in English law will be considered. The focal
point  of  the  debate  for  legal  philosophers  in  recent  years  has  been  two  particular
accounts which have developed, which have framed the debate. Issues regarding the
earlier formulations of ‘recklessness’ resulted in the first comprehensive accounts. Thus,
understanding the context,  and thereby knowing what problems legislators sought to
avoid, is important to evaluating the accounts.
1. Early thoughts on Recklessness
For a long time, the term “reckless” was used in English courts without any explicit
definition. However, throughout much of its earlier history, the word was not always
used in such a way as to imply fault or culpability. For instance, one early example takes
place in 1874. Henry Pembliton, a man who had been fighting with some persons in the
street outside a pub threw a stone with the intention of hitting one of them. However, he
missed, hitting and breaking a window of a pub he had earlier frequented. Pembliton
was accused of “unlawfully and maliciously” causing the damage under the Malicious
Injury to Property Act23. He was acquitted on the grounds that he was unaware of the
likelihood of breaking the window. His being “reckless whether he did it or not” and
“reckless  of  the  consequence  of  his  act”  was  seen  to  exculpate  him.  At  this  time
“malice” was required for crimes of this kind, and being merely reckless was thought to
preclude that. 
Part of this older meaning is retained in the current use of the word, specifically the
lack of knowledge of the consequences.  Reckless behaviour concerns actions where
there is a risk of some eventuality, but no knowledge, as the eventuality is not certain to
obtain.  In  Pembliton,  it  was  judged that  as  Pembliton had no intent  to  damage the
23 The Queen v Pembliton [1874], L.L. 2, C.C.R.119
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window, he could not have “unlawfully and maliciously” broken it. Judge Blackburn
argued that it was “impossible to say in this case that the prisoner has maliciously done
an act which he did not intend to do”. One might have thought that his intent – to hit
people with stones – was malicious anyway, so his  action  was  malicious. Throwing
stones  with  the  intention  of  hitting  people  (absent  any mitigating  circumstances)  is
obviously blameworthy. Though not articulated in the case, this is an instance of the
‘doctrine of transferred malice’, which holds that if someone “causes injury to a person
or property other than the person or property which he intended to attack, he is guilty of
a crime of the same degree as if he had achieved his object”24, but the doctrine holds
only when the harm done is  of  the  same kind as  the harm intended.  As Pembliton
intended to hurt people with a stone, not damage property, the intent is seen as non-
transferrable. If, however, he had hit some other  people with the stone, this is of the
same kind of harm, and the prosecution would have held. Because this case captures one
intention – to hit people with a stone – and results in an unforeseen harm of a different
kind – the breaking of a window – this case has gone on to be cited in several important
cases of recklessness, notably Cunningham and R v G, which will be mentioned shortly.
Later in the nineteenth century, a more familiar usage of the term “reckless”, as well
as suggestions towards a definition were mooted in the context of an alleged fraud case.
Without an explicit  definition,  or restricted sense of the word defined in legislation,
judges (and jurors) have to consider the ordinary English meanings of such terms25.
Thus, when concepts such as recklessness appear in legislation without any specific or
restricted definition, it is up to judges to engage in conceptual analysis of the terms.
Derry v Peek26 involves a discussion about recklessness in speech.
24 Archbold 2013 Edition, Chapter 17, Section I. E.
25 This is expressed explicitly by Justice Donovan in R v Bates [1952] Cr. App. R. 175, though Glanville 
Williams made clear that he thought an established legal precedent for the term was already in place 
(1953: p.234)
26 Derry v Peek [1889] App.Cas.487
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Derry  and  his  associates  ran  a  tramway  company.  A recent  act  allowed  tram
companies that had been given the consent of the Board of Trade to move their carriages
with steam power as well as merely by animal power. Derry and his colleagues assumed
that such permission would be easily acquired,  and published prospectuses for their
company, with the aim of selling shares. The prospectuses indicated that the company
would be able to use steam power for their carriages. William Peek bought shares based
on this.  However,  the company did not  get  consent,  and was later  wound up.  Peek
accused Derry and his associates of fraud. The facts of the case were not in dispute:
Derry and his associates believed, though with no good reason, that they would get
consent to use steam power.
Fraud was defined as having occurred when a false representation had been made
(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be
true or false. This begins to suggest a definition at recklessness, but even this is very
ambiguous. One interpretation of (3) is that the agent is careless about the truth of the
claim,  that  Derry  didn’t  care  whether  or  not  (or  did  not  take  care  that)  what  was
published in the prospectus was true. A second interpretation is that the agent’s beliefs
of something’s truth or falsity have been formed in a careless way. The Lords opted for
the  first  of  these  interpretations.  Lords  Bramwell  and  Herschell  both  challenge  the
equivocation of statements which are made “recklessly, without care whether it be true
or false” and those made “without any reasonable ground for believing it to be true”27.
The  latter  may  be  honest  mistakes,  whereas  the  former  betrays  an  attitude  of
indifference to the consequence, namely whether or not the audience believes something
true. As Derry and his associates were judged to be merely careless in forming beliefs
without reasonable ground, not deliberately deceiving or risking deception, they were
found innocent of fraud.
Although this case focusses on representation, elements can be extrapolated into the
general topic of recklessness. To be fraudulent recklessly, it is suggested that one must
take some sort of risk (such as that of giving a false representation) and display an
indifference or carelessness to some material element (such as another’s beliefs).
27 [1889] App.Cas.487, p.350,361.
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2. Cunningham Recklessness
In discussions of English law in recent years, two particular accounts of recklessness
have received significant  attention.  The first  of  these is  ‘Cunningham recklessness’.
This arose from the case R v Cunningham in 195728, wherein a man disconnected and
stole a gas meter for the money inside. The gas meter was located in the cellar of a
house belonging to his future mother-in-law, but was vacant at the time. In stealing the
gas meter, Roy Cunningham released a dangerous amount of gas into the residence, as
well  as the adjoining residence.  The residences were formerly one house which had
been ‘roughly’ converted  into  two,  separated  by a  ‘honeycomb wall’,  which  it  was
obvious the gas could penetrate. Cunningham knew that an elderly lady and her husband
lived  in  the  adjoining  residence.  There  was  a  stop  tap  next  to  the  gas  meter,  but
Cunningham did not turn it off. As a result the gas percolated through the house and
“partially asphyxiated” the elderly woman next door endangering her life.
Cunningham was charged with larceny of the gas meter and its contents, which he
admitted to, and was sentenced to six months imprisonment. He was also charged with
the  more  serious  charge  under  the  Offences  Against  the  Person  Act  of  186129 of
“maliciously administering poison…so as to  endanger  life  or inflict  grievous bodily
harm”.  At trial, the jury was instructed that “malicious” was to be interpreted as acting
“wickedly”, doing “something which he has no business to do and perfectly well knows
it”. Cunningham was convicted, but an appeal against this was made on the grounds that
the jury were misdirected as to the meaning of “malicious”. 
The major claim was that for one to act “maliciously”, a certain mens rea would be
necessary, and merely doing something he had “no business to do and he perfectly well
28 [1957] All ER 412. 
29 Offences against the Person Act 1861, s.23: “Whoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to 
or cause to be administered to or taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious 
thing, so as thereby to endanger the life of such person, or so as thereby to inflict upon such person any 
grievous bodily harm, shall be guilty of felony”. This law is still in force today. 
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knows it” fails to suffice. It could be agreed that he had no business in stealing the gas
meter without having maliciously causing the neighbour to be exposed to the gas. If, for
instance, he thought the neighbour was out, or that the wall wouldn’t let the gas seep
through, he certainly wouldn’t seem to have exposed her to gas maliciously. In defence
of Cunningham, his  lawyer appealed to Professor C.S. Kenny,  who had argued that
“malice must not be taken in the old sense of wickedness in general, but as requiring
either (1) an actual intention to do the particular type of harm that was done; or (2)
recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i.e. the accused has foreseen
that the particular harm might be done and has yet gone on to take the risk of it).”
Applying the verdict  of  Pembliton,  that  a  lack  of  foresight  of  the  type  of  harm
caused exculpates one of a charge of malice, it was ruled that the trial judge had erred,
and an appeal was granted. It was decided that the jury should have been instructed that
Cunningham would have acted maliciously only if he “foresaw that the removal of the
gas meter might cause injury to someone but nevertheless removed it.” 
This  entrenched  Kenny’s  definition  into  law.  Cunningham recklessness  can  be
defined as acting without intent to cause harm, but with the awareness that the action
may cause such harm.
3. Expanding and clarifying Cunningham recklessness
The  above  suggestion  from  Kenny  which  forms  the  foundation  of  Cunningham
recklessness obviously leaves a lot open and without additional provisions would be
wildly unacceptable. For instance, it would apply to justified risks. A surgeon may well
embark upon a dangerous surgery with a very high mortality rate to try to save a dying
patient, but doing so does not make them reckless. Appropriately, from Cunningham a
more sophisticated account of recklessness developed. During the 1970s this became the
orthodox  view  (Duff  1990:  p.  144).  As  described  in  1989  Code,  a  person  acts
“‘recklessly’ with respect to -
i) A circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist.
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ii) A result  when he  is  aware  of  a  risk  that  it  will  occur;  and  it  is,  in  the
circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take that risk.”
(1989 Code: (cl.18(c)))
There are several features of this account which warrant attention. Primarily, there is the
subjective awareness of risk, as featured in  Cunningham. Whereas crimes committed
purposefully or knowingly require certainty (or practical certainty) that an effect will be
brought about by one’s actions, for recklessness one need only be aware that the effect
might be a result.
Secondly, although this is the orthodox  subjectivist  account, it  contains elements,
which are nonetheless objective. The reasonableness of the risk, even in this orthodox
subjectivist view, was held to be objective. This has to be the case, as otherwise any
agent accused of recklessness could claim that they thought the risk was reasonable. As
people may have wildly different values, a person who recklessly endangers another’s
life, for example, by shooting errantly while hunting, may even believe that their risk
was  reasonable,  just  because  they  enjoy  hunting  so  much.  A reasonable  person,
however, is likely to think otherwise. It isn’t merely the degree of risk taken by an agent
that determines whether it was reasonable either. It is important to take into account
what the agent hopes to gain by taking that risk, and making an overall decision based
on the entirety of the situation. Courts must “balance the seriousness of the risk against
the gravity of the harm” (Elliott 2004: p.32). An agent who drives recklessly fast30 so
she  can  get  to  the  shops  before  they  close,  is  likely  to  be  deemed  unreasonable.
However, if the agent is driving in the same manner because of a passenger undergoing
a  medical  emergency and  desperately  needing  to  get  to  a  hospital,  it  may well  be
reasonable.
Another notable feature of the orthodox subjectivist account is that it doesn’t require
that  an agent  be indifferent  to  the consequences (Duff 1990:  p.143).  An agent  who
unreasonably  risks  hitting  bystanders  with  rubbish  she  throws  over  a  wall  may be
indifferent to that risk, or she may hope she misses any bystanders. Either way, under
30 “Reckless driving” is no longer a crime in the UK, having been replaced by more specific car-specific 
laws, but I think this point still holds, and illustrates the point nicely. 
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this account, the act is reckless. The attitude of an agent is seen as irrelevant. An agent
can only be held culpable for what she chooses.
4. Issues in Cunningham recklessness
There are several criticisms and difficulties that arise with Cunningham recklessness. 
A major feature of  Cunningham recklessness is that the definition is subjective; it
relies on the foresight of risk of the particular agent. Consequently,  it  fails to attach
culpability  to  any  agent  who  simply  doesn’t  think  about  the  risks  of  their  actions
(Crosby 2008: p.314). Some argue that the law would be justified in not requiring the
foresight of risk, particularly for more serious harms, so as to impose the duties upon
citizens to ensure that they don’t commit such crimes (Campbell and Ashworth 1991:
p.191). If someone were to cultivate their character such that they didn’t consider risks
and acted dangerously to themselves and others around them, this would certainly be
characterised as reckless, yet this account fails to capture that. This also has the practical
consequence that anyone accused of a crime committed recklessly could deny (often
plausibly) that they noticed any such risk.
It appears to be a difficulty for Cunningham recklessness that a rash act of violence
with  no  thought  of  the  consequences,  something  that  typically  would  be  seen  as
reckless, might fail to count as reckless. Without any foresight of risk, one cannot be
reckless. Duff illustrates an example from Scottish law. In  Miller and Denovan,  two
young men commit a robbery, and in the process of doing so, Mr Miller hit a man with a
piece of wood so hard that the man later died (Duff 1990: p.157). It was later argued
that while hitting the victim with the wood, Mr Miller wasn’t thinking at all about any
potential risks of his behaviour. If this was in fact the case, and foresight of risk is
required – as in Cunningham recklessness – Mr Miller would not have been reckless in
his  action.  If  a  lack  of  foresight  proves  an obstacle  to  a  verdict  of  this  type  under
Cunningham recklessness, this needs some justification.
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One related problem for Cunningham recklessness comes about when we consider
self-induced  intoxication.  If  a  person  is  only  held  liable  for  committing  a  crime
recklessly if they have an awareness of the risks of their conduct, someone who is blind
drunk  and  thus  incapable  of  acknowledging  any  such  risk  becomes  exempt  from
prosecution. In  The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discussed the position that crimes
committed by a drunken people should result in increased punishments, as it would be
more expedient (The Nicomachean Ethics: Book 3, chap.5, 1113b.32). We might not
agree with this, but ordinarily we would blame a drunken person and suppose them to
be liable for their actions. It was a scenario such as this that gave the courts reason to
acknowledge another form of recklessness. 
5. Caldwell recklessness
‘Caldwell recklessness’ arose from a 1982 case31.  James Caldwell  had “a grievance”
with his employer,  who was the proprietor of a hotel.  One night, Caldwell  got very
drunk and in the early hours of the morning he decided to get revenge by setting fire to
the hotel. He started a fire on the ground floor of the building, where there were ten
guests staying that night. The fire was put out before any serious damage was done and
nobody was harmed. 
Caldwell faced two counts of arson under the 1971 Criminal Damage Act. The first
count, which Caldwell pleaded guilty to, was of destroying or damaging property32. The
second charge was of “intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of
another  or  being  reckless  as  to  whether  the  life  of  another  would  be  thereby
endangered.” Caldwell denied that he intended to endanger any lives or was reckless
about endangering them, claiming he was so drunk that the thought that there were
31 R v Caldwell [1982] A.C.341
32 Criminal Damage Act 1971: c.48 (1)(1) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any 
property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to 
whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.”
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people in the hotel whose lives may be endangered “had never crossed his mind”33.
Arguments of this sort are also extremely problematic in certain cases of rape, wherein
the accused claims that the possibility of a lack of consent hadn’t even crossed their
mind.
It was unclear in English law at the time whether a crime like this permitted self-
induced intoxication to constitute part of a defence34. Laws in several other countries
allowed an appropriate state of mind for any given crime to be imputed to persons who
had committed them while intoxicated35. In Scotland, a defendant cannot claim to be too
intoxicated to satisfy the required mens rea element, as the intoxication itself counts as a
“continuing  element  and  therefore  an  integral  part  of  any  crime”36.  With  no  such
exceptions qualified in English law, the standard tests for intending or being reckless
applied.  At  the  time,  it  seemed  this  would  be  Cunningham recklessness,  but  Lord
Diplock, objected to that account. 
Diplock argued, against  Cunningham  recklessness, that it was overly complicated
for juries to consider. It required, he supposed, “meticulous analysis…of the thoughts
that  passed” in  the mind of  the defendant  (pp.351-2).  Diplock claimed there  was a
“narrow dividing line”, and that a jury would need to perceive which side of this line the
defendant’s mind was in. According to  Cunningham, if an agent briefly considered a
risk, but because “his mind was affected by rage or excitement or confused by drink”,
he didn’t realise the severity of the risk or trusted “that good luck would prevent its
happening”, they would be found guilty. However, if for the exact same reasons the
agent didn’t consider the risk at all, they would escape conviction. Lord Diplock viewed
33 [1982]A.C.343
34 It was unclear whether or not the Majewski verdict ([1977] A.C.443) was applicable in this case. 
Majewski will be discussed later. 
35 In Caldwell (p.345-6) the law in Scotland is cited as not allowing “self-induced intoxication as a 
defence to a criminal charge.” 
36 [1977] J.C.38, Brennan v H.M. Advocate. 
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neither of these situations as less blameworthy than the other and thought it would fail
to be a “practicable distinction” for juries. 
Diplock  revisited  Kenny’s  comments  on  recklessness.  Though  Diplock  lauded
Kenny’s  comments  and  Cunningham  recklessness  was  based  on  such  comments,
Diplock suggested that  those comments  had been misinterpreted.  He considered the
requirement  of  “recklessness  as  to  whether  such harm should  occur  or  not  (i.e.  the
accused has foreseen that the particular harm might be done and has yet gone on to take
the risk of it)”, which was contained in Kenny’s discussion of what was required for
malice. Diplock thought that “recklessness” covered “a whole range of states of mind
from  failing  to  give  any  thought  at  all  to  whether  or  not  there  is  any  risk…to
recognising  the  existence  of  the  risk  and  nevertheless  going  on  to  ignore  it”.  He
interpreted Professor Kenny’s passage as saying that a “particular species within the
genus reckless states of mind” would constitute malice, and that this species was that
specified in the parentheses (p.351). For Diplock then, the description in the parentheses
should not be interpreted as an account of recklessness, but merely as an example of
when recklessness can constitute legally malicious actions. 
As this particular “species” of recklessness was that deemed necessary for malice,
the precedent it set was inapplicable to the Criminal Damage Act, which does not use
the technical legal expression “malicious”. Lord Diplock then proceeded to provide his
own interpretation of  what  recklessness meant.  For this,  he insisted that  the correct
interpretation was based on “recklessness” as an “ordinary English word”.  
He suggests, with regard to criminal damage, the meaning of “reckless” requires of
an agent that:
(1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed
or damaged and 
(2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there
being  any  such  risk  or  has  recognised  that  there  was  some  risk  involved  and  has
nonetheless gone on to do it.
(Caldwell: p.354)
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This account aims to avoid any defence based upon self-induced intoxication. If,
because of rage or excitement or drink, an agent failed to notice an obvious risk, thus
didn’t  give  any  thought  to  such  risk,  they  could  still  be  convicted.  This  allowed
Diplock’s contention that this type of person was just as blameworthy as the person who
had noticed but  not  appreciated the risk to  be reflected in  law. Crucially,  Diplock’s
formulation accounts for agents deliberately closing their minds to a risk they may be
creating. If the risk is “obvious”, they will be liable. The “obvious risk” also seems to
apply to rash acts of violence. The risk of such acts would be obvious, so would fall into
Diplock’s definition.
This  redresses  three  of  the  difficulties  (self-induced  intoxication  preventing  one
seeing risk, closing one’s mind to risk and impulsive acts of violence) of Cunningham
recklessness noted above.
6. Clarifying Caldwell
A major  difficulty that  became apparent  in  Caldwell recklessness  was  that  the  first
clause made reference to the agent creating an “obvious risk”, without stipulating how
the ‘obviousness’ of a risk was to be determined. It was made clear in the verdict that
“obvious” didn’t  mean obvious to the person accused at  the time of the crime; that
would collapse immediately into foresight of the risk. 
There  are  two candidate  interpretations  of  the  ‘obvious  risk’.  Either  it  is  to  be
evaluated in “conditionally subjective terms”, or from a reasonable person standpoint
(Duff 1990: p.146, G. Williams 1981: pp.267-8, 1988: p.86). The former interpretation
holds that the risk would have been obvious to the accused if she had given any thought
to the matter. If we imagine that (quite plausibly) James Caldwell didn’t notice the risk
to those in the hotel, but would have noticed such a risk if he not been drunk, he would
then be found reckless. This would still hold culpable the agents Lord Diplock wanted,
namely those who failed to consider risk because of rage, excitement or intoxication. 
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A difficulty here lies determining just how much an agent might need to think to
notice an obvious risk. If the condition we are holding them to is that of using all the
knowledge they have to an optimal level, this would become a very strict account. This
is clearly not intended, but the extent an agent would have to think in order to notice a
risk for that risk to be obvious is unclear. Duff criticises the use of this interpretation for
these reasons, suggesting that it would erode the distinction between recklessness and
negligence (Duff 1982b: p.281). If the condition an agent is compared to is one wherein
they  would  recognise  all  the  factors  they  should recognise  this  problem  becomes
apparent.  If  one  should  notice  all  the  obvious  risks,  but  for  some  reason,  like
drunkenness, grossly deviates from this, a conditional subjective account of recklessness
might find them reckless. Ordinarily, however, not noticing some risk that one should
notice would class as negligence. The alternative is to accept as ‘obvious’ what would
have been obvious to a person meeting some objective awareness standard; that of a
reasonable person37, an “ordinary prudent individual”38. 
Glanville  Williams  argues  that  Diplock  actually  intended  the  conditionally
subjective interpretation, and favouring this interpretation (1988: p.85, n.23), Williams
provides  a  very  interesting  example  which  illustrates  its  difference  to  the  ordinary
person test (1981:p.269). The defendant, Pike39, had an unusual desire to have sex with
unconscious women. To satisfy this desire, he sought and got permission from women
to be anaesthetised. The women knowingly consented to allowing him to anaesthetise
them  and  have  sex  with  them.  Pike  would  perform  this  by  administering  carbon
tetrachloride (a readily available household item that carried with it no warning labels).
37 This interpretation receives non-explicit endorsement from Diplock in Caldwell. He suggests that 
considering recklessness does “call for some consideration of how the mind of an ordinary prudent 
individual would have reacted” (p.354).
38 This apparent equivocation between the “reasonable” person and the “ordinary, prudent” person is 
certainly possible to challenge, as Baron does in “The Standard of the Reasonable Person” (2011: p.28). 
This, however, was a commonplace interpretation; Glanville Williams (1981) and Duff (1982b) both take 
this reading. The potential difference in viability of the theory under these interpretations will be 
discussed later. 
39 [1961] Crim. L.R.547. 
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He did this several times with no problems resulting, until the final occasion, in which
the woman in question died. On the conditionally subjective interpretation, he would
not be acting recklessly, as even if the defendant had thought about it he would not have
noticed a risk. On the reasonable person interpretation, however, this must be deemed
reckless,  as  reasonable  people  would  deem knocking  a  person  unconscious  a  risky
behaviour.  Williams thought  that  putting controls  upon the sales  of such goods and
having warning labels on them was a better way to protect the public against such risks
than punishing someone like Pike. If such a warning label was in place, a subjective
conditional test would also find such a person reckless, should they continue to act in
such a way.
The question of which interpretation of ‘obvious’ applied was settled in Elliott v C40.
The defendant, a 14-year old girl of low intelligence had been out with a 16 year old
friend and had hoped to spend the night at that friend’s house. After she was not allowed
to spend the night at the friend’s house, the girl did not go home, but stayed out all
night. At around 5am, the girl entered a garden shed for shelter. Among the contents of
the shed were a bottle of white spirit and some matches. While playing with the contents
of the shed, the girl burned down the shed. It was found by the judges that the minor
had no appreciation of how flammable the spirit was, or of the risk she was creating. 
In this case it was explicitly considered whether the law had determined how to
interpret an “obvious risk”: whether a risk should be obvious to “a reasonably prudent
man” or “the particular defendant if he or she had given thought to it” ([1983]1 W.L.R.
p. 945). It was held that the “reasonably prudent person” test should determine whether
a risk is obvious, so although the minor would not have recognised a risk even if she
had considered it, she was found guilty of arson. Though there was no way she could
have  recognised  the  risk  she  created,  she  was  found guilty  of  being  reckless  as  to
creating that risk.
40 [1983] 1 W.L.R.939.
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7. Issues with Caldwell recklessness and its demise
The objective test for “obvious risks” soon proved to have disturbing implication. In
Elliott v C, for instance, Judge Glidewell found himself forced by precedent to arrive at
the guilty verdict, but didn’t think it was the correct one. The implication of this verdict
meant  that  even  those  of  diminished  capacity  –  a  sleep  deprived  minor  of  low
intelligence – would face the objectivity of the reasonable person standpoint. Worries of
this  nature  might  be  quelled  by  the  availability  of  diminished  capacity  defences,
allowing special  defences  against  prosecution  in  some circumstances  for  those  who
would be unable to fully comprehend what they were doing. Despite this, the threat of
punishment for those with diminished capacities or minors for not noticing “obvious
risks” (as evaluated under the ordinary person test) was a source of major criticism for
Caldwell recklessness. I will return to this issue later.
The disjunction in the second clause of the Caldwell account finds someone reckless
if either she “has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or
has recognised that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it”.
There is clearly a gap here for those who consider a risk, but deem that there isn’t one.
We might  imagine  that  Cunningham thought  about  his  neighbour’s  safety,  but  then
remembered (or  misremembered)  that  she had gone on holiday,  so  would  be  in  no
danger. He then would have thought about the possibility of the risk, but not recognised
that there actually was a risk, and thus not be reckless. Diplock obviously intended to
exculpate those who genuinely considered a risk and through a genuine mistake thought
either that there was no risk or that they had taken steps to eliminate the risk41. 
One case where this defence was attempted is  Shimmen42.  In this case a man with
martial arts training tried to show off some of his skills to a group of friends. He decided
he would demonstrate his control by kicking very close to a window, but not touching it.
It was argued that he realised some risk, so instead of aiming to miss the window by
41 If he hadn’t, the second clause of the Caldwell account would be entirely redundant.
42 Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v Shimmen [1987] 84 Cr. App. R.7  
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2mm,  as  he  would  often  do  with  such  exercises,  he  aimed  2cm  away  instead  to
eliminate the risk. Despite this adjustment, he still hit the window and broke it, causing
£495  worth  of  damage  and  was  charged  under  the  Criminal  Damage  Act.  It  was
eventually decided that Shimmen was aware of  some  risk, and that he clearly hadn’t
removed all risk, which could easily have been done by not kicking near the window. If
Shimmen  genuinely  had  thought  there  was  no  risk  in  the  first  place,  or  that  his
adjustment had removed all risk, the  Caldwell verdict must seemingly exculpate him,
which seems undesirable.
A similar problem that results from Caldwell  recklessness is that it lends itself to
several  loopholes.  An agent  who sees  an obvious  risk that  would result  from some
action, but unreasonably disregards it as negligible, before carrying it out, would still be
exculpated. In the instance of agents who regard a risk as negligible because of self-
induced intoxication, it is hard to imagine that Lord Diplock would have intended to
exonerate  them.  We can imagine  a  modified  version  of  the  Caldwell  case,  wherein
James Caldwell did consider the risk to others, but ruled out the risk for a bad reason.
Perhaps we might imagine he thought about dangers to people in the hotel, but thought
everyone would be home at 3am, so there would be no danger. Presumably such agents
would be blameworthy to a similar degree as a person not noticing a risk because of
drink, or one who has noticed it but because of a drink-induced optimism trusts that
good luck would prevent it.
The application of the reasonable person test for obviousness of risk also arrives at
peculiar verdicts in some cases where an agent has specialist knowledge. If someone has
specialist knowledge which makes them aware of a risk that would ensue because of
some action, the risk would not be an “obvious risk”. This could allow situations of
educated people taking particular obscure risks at their will. There doesn’t seem to be
any viable  reason why an  agent  taking  a  risk  which  would  not  be  apparent  to  the
majority of people could not be reckless in doing so, yet the Caldwell judgment, when
interpreted this way, doesn’t allow for this. 
In  2004,  over  twenty  years  after  it  was  implemented,  the  Caldwell account  of
recklessness  was  eliminated  entirely  from  English  law,  leaving  the  Cunningham
direction to be relied upon. It was a case similar to  Elliott v C that finally forced the
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change43. Two boys, aged 11 and 12 had gone camping without their parents’ permission
and started a fire underneath a plastic wheelie bin,  not realising that the fire would
spread. There was, it was found, an obvious risk of the fire spreading, but not one that
the boys had noticed, or would have noticed even if they had thought about it.  The
resulting fire caused £1 million of damage. Lord Bingham argued that a “conviction of a
serious crime should defend on proof not simply that the defendant caused (by act or
omission) an injurious result to another, but also that his state of mind when so acting
was culpable “44. Though the lords considered refinements to make the account more
palatable45,  they ultimately decided to dispatch of the entire  objectivist  notion.  Lord
Rodger cited the significant academic criticism, particularly that of Glanville Williams,
and  the  clear  preference  (among  legal  philosophers  and  judges46)  for  a  subjectivist
notion  of  recklessness,  as  giving  reasons  to  return  to  a  Cunningham account  of
recklessness.
Though the House of Lords thought that Caldwell recklessness was so flawed that it
must  be entirely abandoned,  we can ask whether  or not  there was something to  be
salvaged from the objectivist account. This will be discussed in the following section.
43 R v G [2003] UKHL 50; [2004] 1 A.C.1034. 
44 R v G, [32]
45 Ibid [62]
46 This preference from judges is discussed in Elliott 2004 (p.31). 
30
III. Problems of Cunningham and Caldwell Recklessness
In this chapter I shall provide three types of cases that pose particular problems for the
Cunnigham and  Caldwell  accounts  of  recklessness  and  also  comment  on  some
difficulties relating to the reasonable person standard. I shall then suggest that a general
consideration of culpability is required in order to uncover the best way to deal with
these issues.
1. Bind-drunk cases
Cunningham recklessness, as depicted, has no way to deal with cases wherein an agent
has become so intoxicated he has failed to appreciate a clear risk. It is possible to have a
clause, like in Scots law, which removes intoxication as a defence. This can be done in
several ways. One possibility is allowing intoxication to class as a separate mens rea (R.
Williams 2013 p.266). In addition to purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence,
intoxication  would be  an  available  mens rea  category.  Alternatively,  the  intoxicated
agent  could  simply not  be permitted  to  provide  any evidence of  intoxication in  his
defence47. A third option is asking the jury to decide whether or not the accused would
have noticed the risks of their behaviour had they been sober (R. Williams 2013: p.268).
Rebecca Williams criticises these manoeuvres, arguing that they “punish intoxication
itself” (2013: p.267). 
More pressingly (philosophically), such account fails to acknowledge what  makes
the agent culpable for their crimes while drunk. If a mens rea is required in order to find
47 Rebecca Williams says this avenue must not be taken because of s.8 of The Criminal Justice Act, 
which holds that:
“A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,—
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reasons only of 
its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such 
inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.”
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someone culpable, this solution seems to fail.  Rather than address a culpable mental
state, it requires that a hypothetical mental condition of the agent is considered. 
One  attempt  to  amend  English  law  to  suitably  deal  with  intoxicated  offenders
resulted from  Majewski48.  Majewski,  after  taking a  combination of  drink and drugs,
became extremely violent in a public house. After his arrest, he attacked several police
officers. He was charged with occasioning bodily harm and assaulting a police officer.
Majewski’s  representatives  argued that  all  crimes  other  than  those  of  strict  liability
require intent on behalf of the accused, and that as Majewski was unable to form any
intent  because  of  the  combination  of  drink  and  drugs  in  his  system,  he  should  be
exculpated. 
The verdict in  Majewski was that a distinction was to be made between crimes of
basic intent and crimes also requiring specific intent49. Most crimes, it was decided, only
require  a  basic  intent,  which  could  be  satisfied  even  by the  extremely  intoxicated.
Hitting someone (deliberately) would satisfy the basic intent required for assault, and
this could be conducted even when blind-drunk. Crimes of specific intent, however, are
generally distinguished by involving some future intention, as well as aware of statutory
attendant circumstances (Dressler 1995: §10.06). Larceny, for example, would require
the knowledge of the attendant circumstances (that the items taken belonged to someone
else) and the intention to deprive the owner of their possessions (to steal). Murder is
also an offense of specific intent – to deprive the victim of their life – so could be
challenged if the defendant was so drunk they didn’t realise what they were doing (as
was the case in  Beard, where a manslaughter verdict was substituted50). Even in cases
like this it would need to be demonstrated that the accused actually didn’t satisfy the
mens rea requirement;  a jury would need to be convinced that they didn’t  have the
intent required for the specific crime.
48 [1977] A.C.443
49 Basic intent is also sometimes referred to as “general intent” (Dressler 1995: §10.06).
50 [1920] A.C.479
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Turner  claims  that  “certain  cases  of  insanity,  infancy  and  drunkenness”  make
available the same defence as in cases of involuntary action, as when one is hypnotised,
or physically moved by another person (Turner 1936: p.37). Though we would probably
be sympathetic  to  many cases  of offences  committed by infants or  the insane,  it  is
unclear what circumstances should exculpate a drunken offender. It certainly plausible
that one may be incapable of truly attempting some crimes because of intoxication, so
any constraint on possible defences because of intoxication must be carefully applied.
However,  it  is  unclear  what  marks  the  distinction,  let  alone  whether  it  is  properly
captured by the basic/specific intent. 
Cunningham recklessness could be supplemented with additional stipulations, such
as  Majewski,  which could allow blind-drunken offenders to be deemed reckless, but
without an understanding of what makes the agent reckless, this lacks justification. It is
also unclear whether such a stipulation would apply to all and only those culpable (or a
close approximation). While Cunningham struggles to provide verdicts of recklessness
against those who are intoxicated,  Caldwell  seems to suffer the opposite problem. If
Turner was correct that in some cases drunkenness should provide a similar defence as
insanity or infancy, the Caldwell verdict is too strong.
In both  Cunningham and  Caldwell, an underlying principle determining when an
agent  should  be culpable is lacking. Some such principle seems crucial to ascertaining what
circumstances an intoxicated agent should be held criminally responsible. 
2. ‘The thought never crossed my mind’ 
As mentioned previously,  Cunningham recklessness has a difficulty in accounting for
people who don’t perceive a risk, but really should. In Miller and Denovan, Mr Miller,
who while committing a robbery assaulted someone so hard with a piece of wood that
they died as a result,  should have been aware of the risk to someone else’s life when
performing such an action. Duff notes that these ‘the thought never crossed my mind’
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cases  provide  a  serious  problem  for  most  subjectivist  accounts  of  recklessness51.
Consider again the agent who deliberately trains himself not to notice any risks. This
agent, running with sharp objects, playing with fire, juggling with loaded guns, doing
anything obscenely risky, would then not be deemed reckless, if his mind were unaware
of any associated risks.
This problem was something that concerned Lord Diplock about the  Cunningham
account. If we need to know what was going through a defendant’s mind while they
were committing a crime,  juries will  have a  very difficult  task at  hand. This  is  the
“meticulous analysis” Diplock saw as required by Cunningham recklessness.
In response to this problem we might consider exactly what the awareness of risk
required for culpability here actually entails. Obviously, one does not need to have the
risk somehow verbalised in their inner dialogue to be aware of it. If an agent in the
process  of  committing  arson  was  thinking  “if  I  start  this  fire  it  could  spread  and
endanger lives” at the time, that would certainly be sufficient for awareness of the risk,
but it doesn’t seem necessary. When crossing a road, an agent doesn’t have to think “I
need to look left and right to see if there are cars coming, as they could hurt or kill me”.
One can be well aware of a situation and some of the risks involved without verbalising
them. 
In relation to this problem, Duff makes a distinction between actual knowledge and
latent knowledge (1990: p.159). Latent knowledge is the knowledge that an agent has
whether or not they are making use of it or adverting to it. For example, agents can
know how to tie shoe-laces or ride a bike regardless of whether they’re near a bike or
shoes. This knowledge is stored and available to be called upon when required. If and
when called upon, this knowledge then becomes actual. 
Orthodox  subjectivism  must  be  concerned  with  actual  knowledge.  When  Roy
Cunningham unleashed the dangerous gas, (it is fair to assume) he was aware of the risk
of  the  gas,  that  neighbours  lived  next  door  and that  the  dividing  wall  between the
51 Duff (1990: pp.157-167) would only argue this against most subjectivist accounts because he sees his 
own account as subjective but holds that it avoids such problems. This will be discussed at length in 
chapter IV. 
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residences  was of  a  nature  that  would  allow the  gas  through,  but  he  only had that
knowledge  latently.  If  the  knowledge  had  been  called  upon  and  made  actual,  and
Cunningham became aware of the risk but still went on to take it, we would certainly
deem him reckless and culpable.
How then does this reflect upon agents who are oblivious to risk? It seems unlikely
that a normal person – someone without some sort of diminished capacity – would lack
the  latent  knowledge.  The problem would  be  the  application  of  this  knowledge.  In
appropriate situations, the agent would simply not call upon their latent knowledge. If
someone  had  altered  their  mental  state  such  that  they  naturally  didn’t  recall  latent
knowledge when it was appropriate, it would be hard to see how they would survive. A
person cannot choose whether or not to notice a risk, for in doing so they have already
acknowledged the risk. They may then go on to block out the risk, to do their best to
ignore  it,  pretend  it’s  not  there  and  perhaps  even  reach  a  point  where  the  risk  is
forgotten, but in doing so they would already have been aware of the risk, which is all
the subjectivist needs. As such, the idea of agents who have trained themselves to be
globally ignorant of risks seems wildly implausible. 
The problems for the subjectivist seem to involve the unawareness of specific risks
(or  specific  classes  of  risks).  There  are  both  practical  problems  and  theoretical
problems. One practical problem is this: How can a jury ascertain that an agent was
actually  unaware  of  a  risk,  rather  than  just  claiming so to  avoid  legal  penalties?  A
second problem occurs in cases where we accept that there was an unawareness of risk,
but think not only that the agent should have been aware of the risk, but also that they
are actually culpable for not being aware of the risk. 
The practical problem can be addressed by taking an agent’s conduct as a whole.52 If
a person was truly unaware of some risk they were creating, she is likely to be surprised
if the risked situation obtains. A jury could look at the agent’s conduct before the risk. If
an  agent’s  earlier  actions  suggest  that  they have  noticed  the  risk,  or  if  they appear
unsurprised  by the  outcome,  a  jury is  likely to  determine  that  they were  aware.  In
52 Duff and Glanville Williams both suggest this. However, while Glanville Williams looks at the agent’s 
conduct as to determine whether they were aware, from an orthodox subjectivist position (1988), Duff 
does so to determine the attitude of the agent(e.g. 1990: p.160), which will be discussed in chapter V.
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absence of this, the jury could judge that the agent was unaware, which may exculpate
them. They might ask why an agent didn’t notice a risk in a specific situation. Glanville
Williams  gives  an  example  of  someone  who  is  preoccupied  and  opens  a  car  door
without  checking for  cyclists  (1988:  p.82).  If  the  agent  did  hit  a  cyclist  and cause
serious injury, they might relay the fact of their preoccupation to the jury, who in all
likelihood would sympathise and accept that the driver wasn’t aware of the risk at the
time.
The more theoretical problem – whether or not an agent should be culpable for not
adverting to a risk that they really should have noticed – is somewhat more problematic.
If Mr Miller really didn’t realise a risk of serious harm to his victim, should he not have
been found guilty of the homicide? Similarly, if we consider someone who pulls their
car out of their driveway without looking and hits an oncoming vehicle, we are likely to
think that though they didn’t foresee the risk they created, they certainly should have. It
might be considered that civil liability should suffice in such cases, rather than criminal
proceedings. However, if this were the case, someone who regularly takes serious risks
without considering the risks would only face financial penalties. We might imagine that
a person like this – perhaps someone with considerable means – would not be dissuaded
by the possibility of civil liability, and might continue to risk any surrounding people. If
civil liability is inadequate, some way of incorporating this into the criminal law seems
needed.
A  Cunningham-style  recklessness  test,  considering  only  the  awareness  of  risk,
seems unable to find such agents culpable.  Tests of the  Caldwell-style, on the other
hand, would easily deal with these, as an ordinary prudent individual would certainly be
aware of these types of risks.
A response that might be given to these objections to Cunningham recklessness, is
that these appear to be instances of  negligence, rather than recklessness. These are all
cases wherein an agent was, for whatever reason, unaware of a risk that they should
have been aware of. Several points should be noted here. Firstly, with regard to actual
legislation,  crimes like  criminal  damage require  a  mens  rea  of  recklessness53.  Thus,
53 For example, the Criminal Damage Act, as was relevant in the Caldwell case. 
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currently, for an agent to be convicted in such cases, they would need to be found (at
least) reckless. This might be a motivation to class someone as “reckless” within the
current  framework when  we deem them liable,  but  one  might  alternatively suggest
altering the law to require only negligence for arson.
Secondly, and (I think) more importantly, we do deem cases like this, of pulling out
of one’s driveway without looking as reckless, even if one wasn’t thinking about any
risks involved. This is a reason to call such a person reckless. 
3. ‘I thought she was consenting’ cases
A particular  class  of  cases  that  provide  a  serious  difficulty  for  Cunningham  and
Caldwell accounts  of  recklessness  are  ‘I  thought  she  consented’ cases  (Duff  1990:
p.167). Several such cases occurred in the 1970s and sparked controversy over the laws
concerning rape  the  time.  The first  such case  was  Morgan.  One of  the  defendants,
Morgan, invited three of his friends to have sex with his wife54.  The other defendants
later told the court that Morgan had informed them that his wife was ‘kinky’ and that
they could expect some resistance but that it  “would be a mere pretence”.  The men
proceeded to go to Morgan’s house, whereat they received some genuine resistance,
which they later claimed to believe was the ‘pretence’ Morgan had spoken of. They
claimed that they believed at the time that Mrs Morgan was consenting, despite the fact
that she was dragged into the bedroom struggling, screaming and shouting to her son to
call the police. 
It  was  claimed  that  the  defendants  mistakenly  believed  that  Mrs  Morgan  was
consenting, despite the overwhelming evidence that she was not consenting. According
to the defendants, they each believed that Mrs Morgan consented. It was argued that if
that was not the case, they had made an honest mistake, due to the information provided
by her husband. At this time, it was still not possible for a husband to be convicted of
54 [1976] A.C. 182
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raping his wife, so Morgan himself was charged and convicted of aiding and abetting
the rapes committed by the others55. The other defendants were convicted of rape. 
The trial  judge had thought  that  a reasonable mistake would be required for  an
acquittal on the basis of the following argument. The trial judge (and later the Court of
Appeals)  believed the mens rea requirement  for rape to  be the “intention to  do the
prohibited act”56. If it were accepted that the actus reus – sex “with a woman who at the
time  of  the  intercourse  does  not  consent  to  it”57 –  had  occurred  there  is  a  natural
presumption  that  a  defendant  would  know  that  the  woman  was  not  consenting.
Consequently,  there would be an evidential  burden on the defendant to counter this,
which the trial judge (and later two of the Lords who were later called with regard to the
case)  thought  would  require  evidence  of  a  reasonable  belief58.  The  trial  judge  had
directed  the  jury  that  a  mistaken  belief  in  consent  should  only  allow  them  to  be
acquitted if the mistake was on reasonable grounds and the defendants were convicted.
This was challenged, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals, after which the
case was sent to the House of Lords. The defendants’ solicitors argued that a genuine
mistake, reasonable or not, should exculpate for the crime of rape. If the rape verdict
was overturned, they argued, the charge of aiding and abetting the rapes against Mr
Morgan would also fall, because if no rapes would have taken place then none could
have been abetted59. 
55 Ibid. p. 205
56 Ibid. p. 209
57 This phrasing was used in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976.
58 This argument is given in the original trial ([1976] A.C. 191) and discussed by Duff (1980: p.50)
59 This argument would probably have failed anyway, as it did for the husband in the later case of Cogan.
38
Duff,  despite  supporting the conviction,  also found the jury instruction mistaken
(Duff 1981: p.50). Lord Edmund-Davies agreed that the jury instruction was mistaken,
but found it convincing that even an unreasonable belief should exculpate, arguing that
“honest  belief,  however  foolishly formed,  that  the  woman was willing  seems to  be
incompatible with an intention to rape her60.” 
Lord Hailsham concluded that the relevant mens rea would be the “intent to do the
prohibited act without the consent of the victim” or the intention “to have intercourse
nolens volens, that is recklessly and without caring whether the victim be a consenting
party or not”. He took the intent to have sex without the consent of a victim to be legally
equivalent to the intent to have sex with her whether she consents or not. 61 At this time,
the orthodox subjectivist  account of recklessness was in force,  thus it  was held that
awareness of risk would be necessary to find a defendant guilty in this manner. The
Lords  agreed  by a  3:2  majority,  rejecting  the  argument  that  a  reasonable  belief  of
consent would be necessary. However, despite disagreeing with the jury direction, the
House of Lords rejected any appeal because they deemed it clear that the jury didn’t
accept that the defendants believed Mrs Morgan was consenting and would have found
them guilty even if they had been properly directed.
Though none of the defendants in  Morgan were acquitted, a similar case occurred
later the same year62. In Cogan, after several drinks Mr Leak took a friend, Mr Cogan,
back to his house, with the intention of Cogan having sex with his wife. Leak told his
wife this. She didn’t want to have sex with Cogan, and told her husband of this, but she
was  scared  of  her  husband  so  went  upstairs  and  undressed.  Leak  had  told  Cogan
previously that his wife wanted to have sex with him, his intention being to force her to
have sex with Cogan to punish her for refusing his demand for money whilst drunk.
Leak had sex with his wife twice in front of Cogan, after which Cogan had sex with her.
60 Morgan, p.226
61 Morgan, p.209
62 Cogan, [1976] Q.B. 217
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She did not resist, but kept her head turned away from him and was sobbing throughout
the ordeal. Mr Leak could not be charged with rape of his wife, as it was still held that
consent was presumed from the marriage ceremony onwards63, but was charged with
aiding and abetting a rape, allegedly committed by Cogan. 
Originally,  both  Cogan  and  Leak  were  found  guilty,  but  both  appealed  on  the
grounds that  Cogan believed the wife had consented.  It  was argued that  due to  his
intoxication  and what  he  had heard  from Leak about  his  wife,  Cogan “might  have
mistaken the wife’s sobs and distress for expressions of her consent”. This was accepted
and Cogan was found not guilty, while it was still held that Leak was guilty of abetting
the rape, as his wife was unquestionably raped, and he assisted it. 
There is a practical concern that men accused of rape will be able to merely claim
that they believed the woman was consenting. If this defence was available to all those
accused of rape and would result in no rape charges leading to convictions, it would be
a very serious concern. Glanville Williams argues, with regards to Shimmen, that such
concerns are unlikely to be reflected in reality. He argues that in reality, a defendant
would face a “hot-time in the witness box” if trying to convince a jury that he didn’t
recognise any risk (G. Williams 1988: p.77). Most people, after all, are reasonable and a
defendant would be hard-pressed to explain why they did not foresee the sort of risk that
would be obvious to any ordinary person. This argument suggests that it is unlikely that
the man who falsely claims to have unreasonably thought the woman was consenting
would  escape  conviction.  Marcia  Baron,  however,  notes  that  this  argument  is
misleading.  Because  the  standard  of  proof  juries  require  for  conviction  is  “beyond
reasonable doubt”, they are forced to acquit “even if they are completely convinced that
she did not consent and there was no reasonable basis for thinking, at the time of the act,
that she did” (2011: p.11). 
Other  than the practical  concern noted above,  we must  consider  the question of
whether an unreasonable belief of consent should exculpate in such cases. It should be
noted  that  not  only  did  three  of  the  five  lords  working  on  Morgan think  that
unreasonable mistakes about consent legally exculpated an agent from an allegation of
63 Cogan, p.223
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rape, but four of the five thought that was how the law should function (Lord Edmund-
Davies believed that the law should exculpate those who made an honest mistake, but in
his interpretation it didn’t64). Perhaps, an advocate of  Cunningham-recklessness must
hold, like four of the five lords, that an honest mistake does exculpate in cases like
Morgan and Cogan. If this is the case, however, it seems to warrant some explanation.
Consider  Arrogant,  a  hypothetical  man who makes the  honest  mistake – and let  us
accept  that  it  is  an  honest  mistake  –  that  he  is  irresistible,  that  no  woman  could
genuinely turn him down, and proceeds to have sex without consent from a woman who
physically and verbally protests. The Morgan verdict would exculpate Arrogant. Such a
counter-intuitive and wildly problematic upshot requires some justification on behalf of
the Cunningham advocates.
Clearly Cunningham recklessness struggles to deal with cases of this nature. If there
is  no  awareness  of  risk,  no  matter  how  unreasonable  such  an  unawareness  is,  a
defendant is exculpated under Cunningham. Caldwell recklessness, however, we might
think, can accommodate such cases better. The risk in  Morgan was so obvious that a
reasonable person would have been aware of it. However, the defendants (if we believed
their  story)  could  fall  into  the  loophole  of  having given  thought  to  the  matter  and
deemed (erroneously and unreasonably) that there was no risk that she didn’t consent
(Duff 1990: p.167). They might have a “hot-time in the witness box” demonstrating
this, but the Caldell-loophole would – if the account was correct – require that they be
acquitted.
One response  that  could  be  given  to  this  is  that  this  is  the  correct  account  for
recklessness,  but the proper mens rea for rape should be negligence.  As in the “the
thought never crossed my mind cases”, however, it seems that cases such as Arrogant
are instances of recklessness. His arrogance and refusal to see a clear unwillingness to
participate made him reckless.
64 Morgan, p.235.
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4. The alleged problems of the reasonable person standard
In recent years, many objections have been made to the use of the ‘reasonable person’ in
legislation65. This is clearly of relevance to the Caldwell account of recklessness, as this
(once formulated properly) required that a risk be obvious “to a reasonable person”. 
The equivocation of “reasonable person” to mean “ordinary person” resulting in
prosecution in cases like Elliott v C is obviously an undesirable outcome. Any account
which leads to minors or other non-culpably unaware agents being judged by the same
standards as “ordinary” people fails to distinguish the behaviours which make a person
reckless – in the everyday use of the word. As Norrie observes, because of its reliance
on  the  notion  of  the  reasonable,  Caldwell recklessness  “fails  to  distinguish  the
subjectively stupid from the subjectively callous” (1992: p.49). Any account making
similar conflations fails to capture genuine culpability. 
Alexander  and  Ferzan  have  argued  that  “there  is  no  principled  and  rationally
defensible way to define the “reasonable person in the actor’s situation”” (2009: p.81).
They suggest that the unaware agent, A, has belief set B. Belief set B contains no beliefs
about the riskiness of F, where F is some fact A is responsible for. Alexander and Ferzan
suggest  that  the  only non-arbitrary interpretations  of  the  reasonable  person standard
involve  considering  whether  A would  have  noticed  the  risks  of  F  if  he  was  1)  an
omnipotent epistemic agent (one who knows all the facts that relate to the decision) or
2) an agent with the exact beliefs that A did in fact have (2009: p.82). If the omnipotent
agent, Z, is to be considered, one is culpable for every risk one did not notice relating to
one’s conduct, which is clearly far too strong. If the equivalent agent with the same
beliefs, A*, is considered, the agent is never culpable.
If  Alexander  and  Ferzan’s  evaluation  is  correct,  then  even a  properly construed
evaluation of the reasonable person standard can result  in an arbitrary dividing line
between what an agent should and should not be aware of. It would not be undesirable if
the distinction between a culpable and non-culpable agent was arbitrary in this manner,
65 The number of these objections and difficulties in understanding them are discussed in detail in Baron 
(2011).
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so either an alternative way to think about the standard is necessary, or a rejection of the
reasonable person standard entirely.
It  should  be  noted  that  as  well  as  featuring  heavily  in  Caldwell  recklessness,
reasonableness  also  features  in  Cunningham  recklessness.  This  is  evidenced  by the
1989 Code requirement for recklessness that a risk is foreseen by an agent and “it is, in
the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take that risk” (1989 Code: (cl.18(c)).
The unreasonableness of a risk taken features in both Caldwell and Cunningham, so if the
use  of  reasonableness  is  indeed  problematic,  both  these  accounts  may  be  jeopardised.  In
addition, it is not obvious that any alternative standard that conduct could be assessed by could
avoid the alleged difficulties of reasonableness.
There are certainly problems related to the  Caldwell application of the reasonable person
standard. The use of the standard will be discussed in light of further objections in chapter VI.
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IV. Grounds of Culpability
Criminal liability depends (or to put more specifically, should depend) on culpability. If
an agent is not culpable for some action, it seems entirely unjust that they should be
punished for it. If a driver has a seizure (that could not have been reasonably predicted
beforehand) and during the seizure uncontrollably drives the car into a crowd of people,
it seems unfair to blame him for this. If someone acts against an assailant in self-defence
and causes serious bodily harm, she too – if we deemed the force reasonable – would be
blameless. As these agents are not culpable, it would be unfair to punish them. 
As such, culpability should to some extent permit us to structure what is and what is
not punished. Unfortunately, culpability is not a simple notion. It is readily accepted that
culpability requires a moral agent, someone capable of making decisions and making
choices on the basis of those decisions. Jeremy Horder discusses five separate accounts
which attempt to pin down culpability, based on defiance, character, capacity, agency
and  choice  (1993:  p.195).  Here,  I  will  analyse  these  accounts  systematically  and
evaluate  their  successes,  before  showing  the  direct  relevance  for  accounts  of
recklessness.
With regard to each of these accounts, we can question what they would mean for an
account of recklessness, as well as how well they cohere with our general practises.
Problems will arise for some of these accounts concerning how best to accommodate
negligence, attempt crimes and excuses. The accounts can be evaluated by their success
in gratifying or explaining our intuitions in such cases.
In  this  chapter,  I  will  discuss  (and  reject)  defiance  theory,  followed  by  brief
discussions of the capacity theory, the character theory and the agent theory, all which
are presumed by Horder to offer only partial explanations to culpability. Then, I will
begin a serious discussion of choice theory, which is quickly dismissed by Horder. I will
argue that he does so too quickly, that choice subjectivism is stronger than he supposes
and that prima facie arguments for choice subjectivism have affected legal accounts of
recklessness. Despite this, with support of some arguments courtesy of Duff, I argue
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that choice theory does not reflect how we view culpability, and thus should not be used
in support of orthodox subjectivist approaches to recklessness.
1. Horder’s conceptions of culpability
“Defiance”
According  to  one  account,  developed  primarily  by  Jean  Hampton,  the  essence  of
culpability is “defiance”. Hampton argues that there are three ways an agent can be at
fault (culpable): they can act illegally, immorally or irrationally.  The common factor
between them, Hampton suggests, is defiance (1990: p.2). Acting irrationally consists in
acting  against  reason, acting immorally consists in acting  against  morality and acting
illegally consists in acting  against  the law. For Hampton, legal culpability consists in
three subjective elements of an agent. Firstly, the agent “knows that the legal system
commands him not to commit  the action,  i.e.  that it  is  illegal.” He also knows that
because of the authority of laws “he is supposed to have better reason to refrain from
illegal behaviour than to engage in it in order to do something he wishes.” Finally, he
believes that “the authority can be defied, and something else that condones what he
wishes can be enthroned in its place, thereby allowing him to satisfy them” (Hampton
1990: p. 24). 
Under this account, recklessness is taken to be defiantly risking something ruled out
by law. If someone risks a harm forbidden by law, in doing so they undertake the risk in
defiance of the law, which makes them legally culpable. Hampton provides an example
of an agent driving a power boat too quickly to control and crashing it into a dock full
of people. This agent, Hampton claims was reckless not because he deliberately defied
the legal imperatives in place (presumably for this example to make sense, there must
be no legislation in the jurisdiction about how fast one can drive power boats in the
jurisdiction), but because he risked doing so, which is sufficient defiance to render him
legally culpable (1990: p.25).
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Though  Hampton’s  account  might  provide  an  interesting  explanation  for  akratic
behaviour,  as  an  account  of  legal  culpability  it  seems  wholly inadequate.  Hampton
herself acknowledges that defiance as a basis for legal culpability struggles to explain
negligent crimes (1990: p.1).
It also seems counterintuitive that one must be consciously acting against the law –
defying it  – in order to be culpable. A common principle of law is  ignorantia legis
neminem excuat: ignorance of the law excuses no one (Dressler 1996: §1303). When
Shylock attempts to claim his pound of flesh from Antonio, only to discover that it is
unlawful to spill the blood of a Christian, which his contract had not permitted, we do
not deem him exculpated because he didn’t know about that law. He is culpable purely
because he wanted to spill the blood of a Christian. Hampton attempts to explain how
her account explains why some instances of ignorance are excuses, while usually they
are not, by suggesting that in some instances an agent’s failure to remedy her ignorance
makes her “defiant of the authority of the legal system, and hence legally culpable”
(1990: p.25). This would have the upshot of excusing those who could not understand
the law, those of diminished mental capacities, as they may be unable to remedy their
ignorance. However, this seems to overgeneralise: if one is culpable for not learning the
law (supposedly ‘defiantly’),  then that is  the case even for such agents who do not
actually  break  the  law.  Anyone  who  has  not  properly  learned  the  law  and  isn’t
attempting to correct their ignorance would be culpable, which seems to misunderstand
the notion. 
This account seems to put the cart  before the horse. We want to find something
criminally liable because it is culpable, not the other way around. As Horder argues:
“Surely  only  the  most  obsessively  authoritarian  legal  theory…  could  possibly
suggest that what marks out intentional killing or rape as criminally culpable is not the
nature of the harm or the way in which it was caused, but simply the defiance of the law
the action evinced.” 
(1993: p.198)
Due to its unsatisfactory analysis of ignorance, negligence and the direction of fit
between culpability and legislation, this account seems largely untenable.
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“Capacity”
Capacity theory, attributed to H.L.A. Hart, accordingly places the capacities of an agent
at  the  centre  for  culpability.  An agent  is  culpable  for  an  action  because  they were
capable of doing otherwise. This has some inherent plausibility to it: a common rebuttal
when accused of some wrong is  “what else  could I  have done?” and we deem this
appropriate.
Capacity theory also has the upshot of being able to account for negligent crimes.
Hart argues that there is good reason for considering the mens aspect of mens rea not to
be limited to knowledge or foresight, but to also include “the capacities and powers of
normal persons to think about and control their conduct” (Hart 2008: p.140)66. Agents
can then be held criminally responsible for their conduct only if they had the capacity to
do otherwise, even when they have not foreseen the risks of their conduct.
Consider  the  parents  who  forget  their  young  child  in  the  bath  because  they’re
hosting a dinner party and guests have arrived67. They do not intend their child to drown
and they do not even consciously risk that;  they just  haven’t thought about it.  They
became distracted by their dinner guests and the thought of the child was so far from
their thoughts that when they recalled it, it was too late. For capacity theory, we can
hold them culpable because they had the capacity to remember their child; they could
have done better.
A benefit of this theory is that it provides a convincing explanation of why children
and the mentally ill warrant special treatment. These individuals may plausibly fail to
comprehend the risks of certain conduct, no matter how much they think about it or try
to do what is right. Particularly when the defendant is “a child of a lunatic”, we may
66 This consideration is in opposition to his predecessor J.W.C. Turner (as well as Glanville Williams), 
who argued that an accused must have “realized at the time that his conduct would, or might produce 
results of a certain kind, in other words that he must have foreseen that certain consequences were likely 
to follow on his acts or omissions” to be liable under the common law (Turner 1936: p.87, original 
italics). Hart rejects this approach for being insufficiently receptive to subjective elements (2008: p.143). 
67 Alexander and Ferzan make use of this example (2009: p.77). Their verdict of the situation will be 
discussed in chapter V.
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conclude that he was unable to “distinguish a dangerous situation from a harmless one”
or “attend to, or assess its risks” (Hart 2008: p.150).  
We  might  argue  that  the  capacity  theory  lacks  something  in  its  assignment  of
culpability by making reference to free will  literature.  Harry Frankfurt’s  eponymous
examples are designed to show that freedom (and moral evaluation) do not depend on
an agent’s ability to have done otherwise.  Consider  an agent  who is  about  to  vote.
Unbeknownst  to  him,  a  counterfactual  intervener  in  the  form  of  a  wizard  (or
neuroscientist) watches his behaviour, waiting for a certain feature of the agent’s facial
expression that would indicate that the agent is about to vote for Gore. The wizard-
character knows that this sign would come about if, and only if, the agent was about to
vote Gore, and if this happens the wizard will control the agent and  make  him vote
Bush68.  As it  is,  the agent  votes for Bush of his  own volition,  and the wizard does
nothing. Frankfurt argues that the agent could not have done anything differently; if he
tried to, the counterfactual intervener would have stopped him. Though the agent could
not have done otherwise, as they lacked the actual capacity to do otherwise, we still
deem them blameworthy for their action. A capacity theorist might respond to this by
suggesting that the agent had the capacity to choose otherwise, and this is why such an
agent is  culpable,  but this  would only seem to reduce the capacity theory to choice
theory. 
Possibly more damagingly,  Horder  argues (1993: p.203),  the theory is  unable to
stipulate what exactly constitutes an unfair  opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. It  also
doesn’t  offer  an  explanation  of  levels  of  culpability.  Presumably  we  would  like
whatever notion is  the foundation of culpability to  explain why causing some harm
purposely is more culpable than doing so recklessly, but capacity theory is unable to do
this, which Horder sees as an “important shortcoming”. 
“Character”
68 This particular Frankfurt-style example was given by John Fischer in “Frankfurt-style Examples: 
Responsibility and Semi-compatibilism” (1999).
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Character theory holds that culpability is grounded in the bad character of an agent. An
agent who kills, rapes or steals is to be found culpable because their actions demonstrate
a bad character. He is then convicted because those actions “warranted an inference to
some undesirable character trait” (Duff 1996: p.176). 
It is important for such a theory that an agent doesn’t have to choose their character
in order to be culpable for it. Michael Moore attributes a form of character theory to
Aristotle which has such a requirement (1990: p.50). If that is held, then the theory
seems to collapse into a form of choice theory. A character theory must hold that an
agent is responsible for their character, because in an important sense, they  are  their
character.
Character theory is well-placed to acknowledge culpability even if one takes a hard
determinist stance on free will. If one relies on free choices to explain one’s culpability,
the revelation that no choices are actually free, that they are all causally determined in
such a way that precludes freedom of choice – as held by the hard determinist – it
follows that no actions are culpable. A character theorist can hold what Fischer calls a
‘semi-compatibilist’ position69; that causal determinism entails that there is no freedom
in the sense of  free will,  but  that  this  does not  preclude responsibility.  An agent  is
responsible for their actions because of their character. That character might well be
caused, but as that held as the grounding concept for the culpability, that doesn’t matter.
As long as the agent’ action manifests their character, the agent can be held culpable for
it.
One major difficulty that a character theory of culpability faces is that it struggles to
accommodate culpability for actions  that  are  “out  of character”.  If  an agent  is  only
culpable  when acting  upon settled  character  traits  or  dispositions,  a  highly unusual
anomaly in an agent’s behaviour should not be eligible for punishment. However, this
seems highly counter-intuitive,  as someone who lives an ordinary life until  one day
going on a killing spree is still usually seen as criminally culpable. 
69 See Fischer’s “Frankfurt-style Examples: Responsibility and Semi-compatibilism” for an espousal of 
this view. 
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In addition to this serious problem, two other difficulties also deserve mention. As
Horder observes, the account of culpability provided by character theory seems simply
superfluous70.  If  someone has  committed an  unlawful  murder,  this  seems enough to
make them culpable without requiring a bad character. In addition, character theory is
no more able  than capacity theory to account  for differing levels  of mens rea.  It  is
sufficient for criminal culpability that an agent has committed the crime intentionally or
recklessly (or perhaps even negligently); a court need not make value judgements of the
character traits that motivated the crime.
Despite these problems, character theory does seem to have this core insight: the
culpability of criminal actions is inherently related to the attitudes of the characters that
commit them. But perhaps, as Duff has suggested, this core insight is better captured by
focussing more on the role of agency in culpability71. 
“Agency”
The agency theory of culpability holds that an agent is culpable for an action to the
degree it reflects her agency. Depending on the agent’s intention when acting and what
she actually brings about, her action may reflect her agency in varying degrees. There is
a  paradigm picture  of  agency;  an  agent  is  culpable  for  an  action  to  the  degree  it
resembles that paradigm. In a paradigm case of say,  assault,  there is an intention to
inflict a physical harm against someone. Duff makes a distinction between “intended”
and “intentional” agency (1990: p.43, 79). If I push you over because I am annoyed at
you, I intend to push you over. If I am just in a rush, am running and knock you down,
knowing that I will knock you down, but without that being the object of my intention, I
intentionally knock you down, but I don’t “intend” to. What is intended “reveals the
core meaning of the concept of intention” whereas what is merely intentional “involves
70 Horder 1993: p.208.
71 Duff 1996: p.191
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an  extension  of  that  notion”.  A paradigm case  of  assault  probably  only  requires  a
successful, intentional physical attack,  and in such a case, the harm foreseen is also
caused; I decide to knock you down and I actually do so.
Agency theory is  best  understood via an archery metaphor.  When one aims at  a
particular result and succeeds, one hits the “bull’s-eye”, accomplishing the paradigm of
agency. When the result differs from what one has intended in various pertinent ways,
one’s  culpability is  diminished.  The more the action fails  to  resemble the paradigm
(which could be satisfied by the result differing more from what was intended, or the
relationship between the agent’s intentions and the outcome being more obscure), the
less culpable the agent is. 
As  Horder  observes,  the  agency  theory  is  superior  to  the  other  accounts  of
culpability in that only it can properly accommodate different levels of mens rea (1993:
p.209). Reckless offences are generally is less culpable than intentional ones because
they do not fit into the paradigm of successful agency. The criminal outcome of reckless
actions is not aimed at, so incorporating them into the picture of culpability requires an
“extension of the paradigm” (Duff 1990: p. 139) If I am reckless about whether or not I
harm you, this has less resemblance to the paradigm. Incomplete crimes are also less
similar to the paradigm, which supports judgments that these should be punished less
severely72.
That said, agency theory has problems of its own. One issue Horder suggests is a
problem is its supposed inability to account for the non-culpability of children or the
insane (1993: p.214). This would be problematic, because, as the responses to cases like
R v G and Elliott v C (A minor) demonstrate, we do deem children to be less culpable in
many situations. An agency theorist might suggest that the ‘intention’ element, in the
paradigm case is one among a general contextual understanding of a situation. If a child
doesn’t  realise  that  the  substances  they’re  playing  with  are  likely  to  cause  a
conflagration, their intention is different to the paradigm case of arson. We might even
suggest that a child who did understand that there would be a fire and the extent of the
72 This will be discussed further in the next section.
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fire  could  be  less  culpable,  because  we would  not  demand  them to  have  the  same
understanding of the consequences as an adult. 
“Choice”
Michael Moore argues for an account of culpability based in  choice.  Choice theory
holds an agent culpable for an action if “at the moment of such action’s performance”
the agent had “sufficient capacity or opportunity to make the choice to do otherwise”
(Moore 1990: p.29).
Choice theory is easily able to accommodate legal excuses. Excuses in law, like
excuses in morality, are factors which mitigate one’s culpability. If during an outburst of
delirium while ill, I attack the postman with my slippers, thinking him to be a beast
from hell, this is an excuse – an excuse of insanity. Excuses, along with justifications,
offer a  legal  (as well  as moral)  defence.  Excuses differ  from justifications in that a
justification for some action claims “that though the action is of a type that is usually
wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong” (Baron 2005: p.389). An excuse for an
action admits that the action was wrong, even given unusual factors about the situation,
but argues that the agent is not blameworthy. I should not be blamed for throwing my
slippers at the postman, because my delirious state excuses my behaviour. Throwing the
slippers at the postman was still wrong, but I shouldn’t be blamed for it. If the postman
was kicking the neighbour’s young son, I would claim not only that this excuses my
behaviour, but that it makes my behaviour justified.
Moore argues that the choice theory best explains the cases of excuses that we are
confident of (whether they should or should not excuse the agent) and has an intuitive
plausibility,  so is  the  best  account  of  culpability73.  When an agent  doesn’t  have  the
capacity or  opportunity to  make the  contrary choice  there is  a  legal  excuse for  the
73 Moore only explicitly endorses choice theory with regards to excuses, but it seems untenable to hold 
one theory of responsibility for excuses and another for a different aspect of culpability. Despite its 
implausibility, I will address the possibility of employing different accounts of culpability for different 
areas in criminal law later.
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action.  This  conception  has  considerable  prima  facie  appeal.  An  agent  does  the
choosing,  so  if  the  choice  is  freely  made,  it  is  only  appropriate  that  be  deemed
responsible for doing so. 
The most persuasive reason for adopting choice theory, from Moore’s account, is
that it best explains two types of situation (compared to character theory, which he sees
as the obvious rival theory).  According to character theory,  an agent’s culpability is
explained by their bad character. Moore draws out intuitions favouring choice theory by
providing examples wherein choice theory and character theory should provide different
verdicts, and suggesting that the verdicts provided by choice theory are more plausible.
In one type of example, an agent has bad character but makes no free choice to commit
some harm. In the other type, an agent makes a free choice to do some wrong but this
choice is not reflective of the agent’s character. 
A case Moore cites of the first type is that of preventative detention. If, after some
psychoanalysis, it becomes clear that an agent is of bad character, (Moore argues) that
character theory would justify imprisoning them, regardless of any manifestations of
this bad character. A case like this would certainly draw on intuitions that the agent in
question was not culpable. If someone hasn’t actually done something wrong – if they
lack an actus reus – punishment seems inappropriate, undeserved and unjust. This case
might  seem to  interpret  the  character  theorist  unfairly,  as  any serious  advocates  of
character theory require acts that manifest the bad character74. However, that acts  are
required surely suggests that the bad character itself is not sufficient for culpability; it at
least needs an action on that basis too. It could be argued that choice theory would fall
victim to  this  same criticism,  as  it’s  not  the  cognitive  decision-making  faculty that
grounds culpability;  if  it  did,  then it  would similarly justify punishment  without  an
actus reus. An agent could be punished for making the choice to kill his wife, before he
has  even began moving his body to bring the plan into being.  An easy response is
available  to  the choice theorist  here,  however,  that  it  is  the  act  of choosing,  which
requires more than mere cognitive activity, that grounds culpability. While we might
call a mental selection to do an activity a choice, even without any physical indication
74 See Michael Bayles, “Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibility” (1982).
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of this, choice theory must require an actualised choice. It is not clear that the character
theorist can easily make the parallel argument, suggesting that culpability requires an
actualised character trait.
Among the second type of case, Moore cites Richard Herrin, a graduate student who
displayed good character in most aspects of his life, but in an out-of-character act, killed
his girlfriend with a hammer (Moore 1990: p.52). Here, it is argued, Herrin freely chose
to kill his girlfriend, but this action wasn’t reflective of his character, so although the
choice  theory  would  find  him  culpable,  the  character  theory  would  be  forced  to
exculpate him. Once again, if character theory did entail this conclusion, it would be
implausible. However, as Horder notes (1993: p.207), this is not the case, as the actions
need only reflect badly on the character, when compared to some “idealised conception
of good character”, even an anomalous uncharacteristic action can be culpable. Though
Moore might have overestimated the choice theory’s superiority in these cases, it is still
the case that choice theory explains these cases satisfactorily and with an appearance of
plausibility.
If only the actual choices of an agent incur culpability, this seems to have serious
consequences for any account of recklessness. Supposing, for whatever reason, an agent
is completely unaware of a risk, that agent cannot choose to take that risk. If, as Moore
suggests, culpability requires at the “moment of the action’s performance” for an agent
to have the “capacity or opportunity” to do otherwise, it would be difficult to inculpate
the  unaware  agent  we  normally  would  deem  blameworthy.  A drunken  agent  (like
Caldwell), for instance, who while burning down a building with the goal of destroying
the building, not to endanger any lives, unaware of that particular risk, does not choose
to endanger the lives of those in the building. He cannot choose not to risk their lives, as
he is utterly oblivious to such a risk. As Moore stipulated that the capacity must be
present at the “moment of the action’s performance”, we cannot cite the agent’s conduct
as culpable for getting so drunk, despite making several choices that would lead to that
eventuality and eventually to the damage.
One criticism Horder makes of choice theory concerns the nature of choice.  He
correctly points out that a normal understanding of choice is that of a choice between
alternatives. When asked to “pick a card, any card”, one chooses from a selection of 52.
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When a husband chooses to shoot his wife, this choice is one among several options
available to him. However, there are agents who are certainly culpable, who decide to
commit crimes that wouldn’t fit into this conception of choice. If, when killing his wife,
the husband doesn’t consider any alternatives, perhaps because he does so impulsively,
he hasn’t selected from a number of options. Horder gives an example of a man who
spontaneously pushes an innocent bystander under a train. Horder suggests that these
agents do not choose to perform these actions as “they are done spontaneously, without
consideration of courses of action” (1993:p.201). If the choice theory couldn’t find such
actions culpable, it would be completely untenable.
However,  this  understanding  of  choice  as  selection  among  alternatives,  though
typifying the notion, seems both unnecessary and mistaken. If someone is asked what
they would like to drink, and asks for a cup of tea, it is completely natural to say that
this was their choice. This is so even if they hadn’t considered the option of drinking
coffee, or whatever else may have been available. It could be responded that I have
obfuscated a choice in this example, a tacit but obvious choice, of not having a drink at
all. This option, however, also exists in the case of the man pushing a bystander in front
of a train. There is a constant backdrop of the equivalent alternative in any spontaneous
action; you don’t have to choose to do it. Perhaps the argument could be strengthened if
we considered that spontaneous actions aren’t chosen because they are influenced by
some entity alien to oneself; that “a violent urge took over”. A choice theorist can easily
account for this by understanding the person in a broad scope, such that it  includes
sudden urges, even though the agent may not identify with them75.
As  intimated  earlier,  choice  theory  would  have  significant  consequences  for  an
account of recklessness. Any objectivist accounts,  finding agents culpable for taking
risks that they should  have noticed, while oblivious to those risks, so not choosing to
take them, would be unjustifiable. Moore attests that “choice is essential” to culpability,
and if a risk is not adverted to by an agent, the agent doesn’t actually take a risk (1990:
p.57). If these grounds for culpability were accepted, it would provide strong support
for the orthodox subjectivist account, as this requires that any risk is foreseen in order
75 Moore confirms that this is how he would understand the scope of the agent when considering similar 
issues (1990: p.39).
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for the agent to be reckless. Any lower levels of mens rea could only be justified on
pragmatic grounds, not on the basis of deserts.
I  would  suggest  that  not  only  does  the  choice  theory  support  the  orthodox
subjectivist account of recklessness, but also that an underlying belief in choice theory,
or some of the general platitudes of choice theory, has led to recklessness being cashed
out  this  way.  To support  this  contention,  consider  the  Morgan  verdict.  If  the Lords
deciding  this  verdict  were  influenced  by  capacity,  character  or  agency  theories  of
culpability76,  it  seems unlikely that they would have concluded that an unreasonable
belief in consent should exculpate a rape charge. Under capacity theory, focussing as it
does on the agents having a fair opportunity to avoid the relevant harm, it seems clear
that reasonable belief would be required; that would be  fair. Following the tenets of
character  theory would lead to  those actions which manifest  bad character  –  which
having sex with someone under an unreasonable belief of consent presumably does –
inculpating an agent. Agency theory (as will be discussed at length in the upcoming
chapter)  would  also,  in  its  most  plausible  versions,  find  such agents  guilty.  This  is
obviously  not  exhaustive.  There  are  other  reasons  the  Lords  may  have  made  the
decision they did in  Morgan, but presumably all based on some conception of what
should and should not exculpate an agent.
2. Ashworth, Duff and Arguing against choice theory
If choice theory was seen as the natural grounds for culpability by the Lords, as I have
suggested,  it  would  be  hardly  surprising  that  an  orthodox  subjectivist  account  of
recklessness is the dominant account in English law. In the next section, I will attempt
to cast doubt on the choice theory.
One of the attractions of choice theory is its prima facie plausibility. Choices are the
sorts of thing that we are, and should be, responsible for. It seems, however, that we can
76 I have ignored the defiance theory of culpability here, but for the reasons mentioned previously the 
theory does not seem plausible.
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break the theory down further than Moore did. Ashworth takes the theory apart even
further  to  find what  warrants a  “quantum of  punishment”;  the minimum a situation
requires in order for an agent to be culpable (Ashworth 1988: p.742). His argument is
founded on a retributivist theory of punishment, holding that punitive sentences should
only be given according to the deserts of the agent, but the minimum he deems required
relies  upon what  makes  an  agent  culpable.  In  arguing  for  choice  theory,  Ashworth
provides an argument relating to criminal attempts. 
When  an  agent  normally  commits  a  crime,  she  goes  through  six  steps:  she  i)
conceives of the crime, ii) evaluates the idea, iii) forms the intention, iv) prepares to
commit  the crime,  v) commences the crime and vi)  completes her actions (Dressler
1995: §27.01). If the agent only goes through the first three stages, she has committed
no crime in English or American law: no actus reus has taken place. If the fourth stage –
the preparation to commit the crime – takes place, but the agent doesn’t successfully
complete the crime, an agent could still be culpable of an inchoate offence. Solicitation
and  conspiracy  are  inchoate  offences,  but  most  important  for  present  purposes  are
attempts. An attempt can be complete (also called imperfect) or incomplete. A complete
attempt occurs when an agent has gone through all the stages of a crime, but has not
succeeded  in  the  criminal  goal.  A would-be  assassin  can  buy a  gun,  aim it  at  the
president and fire, but she may, due to poor aim or bad conditions, miss her target. Here
the attempt is complete. If, however, she doesn’t carry out all the stages, perhaps she is
apprehended  by  a  policeman  or  changes  her  mind  while  pointing,  the  attempt  is
incomplete. 
Ashworth argues that an agent has no real  control over whether or not an attempt
succeeds. The would-be assassin might try to pull the trigger, but there is no guarantee
that she won’t have an inopportune seizure at that very moment, or that the gun won’t
fail (2011: p.159). There is no way she can be sure that she won’t miss, or a bird would
get in the way and take the bullet in the president’s place. The only actual control we
have is  over the choices that  we make,  and over these – if  we are free – we have
complete control.. 
It seems reasonable that someone should be culpable only for things within their
control. If a man walking down the street not paying attention walked into stationary
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pedestrian bystander, it would be their fault and as a result they may owe an apology or
have the obligation to help the bystander up. If, however, he was pushed by a ruthless
jogger, depriving him of control of his footing, he would not be at fault and may not
have the same obligations. Given that the only element of an action we are in complete
control over is the choice itself, the result of the outcome should be, according to this
argument, irrelevant to the culpability attached to the person. Thus, this argument leads
to accepting an equivalence of culpability between complete attempts and substantive
offences.
Ashworth uses this argument to suggest that after the point at which an agent has
committed the ‘trying’ which may or may not (from their perspective) cause the harm
which  could  potentially  result,  everything  else  depends  on  outcome  luck.  As  the
outcome luck is out of the agent’s control, Ashworth argues, it should not be relevant to
their  culpability.  The  ‘fully  subjectivist  principle’77 of  criminal  liability  seeks  to
eliminate  any culpability  judgments  based  upon chance,  rather  than  what  the  agent
actually controls, which is merely the trying, the act of choosing itself. As the element
controlled in the complete attempt and the substantial offence – the ‘trying’ – is the
same, the subjectivist accepts the “moral equivalence thesis”; that nothing relevant to
the  agent’s  moral  evaluation  differs  in  the  cases  (Duff  1996:  p.334).  Consequently,
punishments for criminal attempts, for the subjectivist, track the choices, regardless of
the ensuing results, so the successful assassination should be punished just as much as
the assassination prevented by a bird blocking the bullet’s path. 
Currently, the law in the US and the UK does not work this way. Attempts, even
complete  attempts,  are  punished  less  severely  than  substantive  offences  (Ashworth
2010).Though  there  are  some  who  agree  with  Ashworth’s  argument  and  hold  that
complete attempts should be punished as severely as substantive offences78, this is far
from the dominant view. There are other arguments that attempts should be punished
equally:  a  utilitarian  argument  for  equal  punishment  notes  that  an  agent  who  has
77 As labelled by Duff (1996: p. 148).
78 Ferzan and Alexander, who will be discussed in chapter V, are prominent advocates of this sort. 
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committed  a  complete  attempt  is  in  need  of  the  same  sort  of  rehabilitation  (if
appropriate)  and has demonstrated that  they are (mentally)  capable of being just  as
dangerous  (Dressler  1995:  §27.04[B]).  However,  such  arguments  have  not  proved
convincing in actual punitive proceedings.
If this theory of attempts were convincing, it would lend even more credence to
choice  theory.  Duff,  however,  provides  a  counter-argument  not  only  to  the  equal
punitive deserts of those committing complete attempts and substantive offences, but
also to their culpability as a whole (1996: 334-347). In doing so, he considers ways in
which  our  responses  to  wrongdoing  differ  in  cases  of  a  complete  attempt  and  a
substantive  offence.  Even  an  advocate  of  the  fully  subjectivist  principle  must
acknowledge the differing responses, so must accept these premises of the argument
(thought they will offer a different explanation). The differences of response are of three
sorts; the response to the act, the response to the agent and the liability that is incurred. 
Suppose  that,  angered  by something  trivial,  a  man  throws a  glass  bottle  in  the
vicinity and direction of an innocent bystander, knowing he may hit them or miss them.
A reasonable witness observing this will respond to the action, and is likely to have
different  responses  (or  at  least  responses  of  differing  intensities)  dependent  on  the
outcome. If the bottle hits the bystander in the head, smashes and leaves them blind in
one eye, the event itself is likely to leave the witness shocked and sympathetic towards
to the victim. This effect is likely to be long-lasting, as events of this sort are not soon
forgotten. If the bottle missed, however, such a witness is likely to react differently.
They may be relieved, and may even be shocked. They would not be shocked at the
harm inflicted though, as no harm, in this case, is actually caused. A witness may also
be sympathetic to the victim, depending on how close the victim was to being injured,
but this will all be to a lower degree, than if the harm were caused.
The man who threw the bottle is also (unless extraordinarily callous) likely to feel
differently  about  the  event.  If  he  hit  the  bystander,  we  would  hope  he  would  feel
regretful,  not just  for throwing the bottle,  but for actually hitting the bystander  and
causing the harm. If he misses, the shock and regret would be for the action only. He
might be shocked that he was capable of risking another’s safety and be thankful that he
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missed. Repentant agents, in either case, would wish that they had not committed the
act.
With regard to the bottle-thrower, a reasonable witness will likely attribute blame.
Whether or not the bottle hits, it might be appropriate to be disgusted by the agent, to
feel angered by them. These are likely to be increased if the harm does ensue. As Duff
notes, if someone actually causes such harm of a serious sort, like the reckless blinding
mentioned – particularly one knows the victim – it  might be difficult  to maintain a
friendship with that person. This response towards the man is likely to be much less
intense, if present at all, if the bottle misses. Similarly, the throwing agent himself will
have a much stronger response towards himself (if repentant) if the bottle actually hits.
He will become in his own eyes, the man who caused that harm. Any shock experienced
by the agent at his own recklessness will be “deeper and more lasting” when the harm
does actually result (1996: p.336).
In terms of liability there will  be a  striking difference between such cases.  The
liability in question here is not legal liability, but one of moral obligation. If an agent,
through some fault, causes a harm, they would normally be expected to compensate a
victim if this is possible. If I recklessly destroy some of your property, I might be liable
to replace it. I will probably owe an apology, not just for my action, but for the damage
itself. When the potential harm does actually ensue from an agent’s free actions, they do
confer upon themselves additional obligations. 
The  subjectivist  concerning  attempts  (and  the  advocate  of  the  choice  theory  of
culpability) must explain these differences in a way which doesn’t alter the culpability
between  the  complete  attempt  and  the  substantial  offence.  Duff  notes  that  the
subjectivist can even give an explanation for why these feelings are appropriate; we
might blame the morally unlucky agent (the one whose action does cause the harm)
more, as they have done something extra which they are ‘to blame’ for, but that the
agent  is  still  not  more blameworthy.  One might  be  ‘blamed’ more,  in  one sense of
blame, when the harm is caused because the agent may have additional obligations as a
result of causing the harm, and the practice of blaming in these situations may make it
more likely that the agent will fulfil these obligations.
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In  all  these  instances,  the  subjectivist  can  claim  that  the  level  of  culpability
attributed  to  the  perpetrating  agent  is  the  same,  in  accordance  with  the  moral
equivalence thesis, and that we should ensure that when theorising about such events,
we ensure that we take proper care to distinguish our feelings of additional  blaming
from the agent’s actual culpability. 
It has already been mentioned that one’s liability is dependent on outcomes. If while
out jogging, not paying attention to what’s going on around me, I bump into and knock
down a pedestrian, I owe them an apology. If necessary I should help them up. These
obligations are conferred upon me by my acting carelessly. It might well be the case that
it was unlikely I would hit someone – perhaps I was only not paying attention to my
surroundings for a few seconds – but if I did, then I certainly have the moral obligation
to help. If I didn’t hit anyone, then no apology would be owed and I wouldn’t have to
help the person up. Perhaps I would mentally scold myself for not looking around if I
realised that I was being careless.
Given that obligations track outcomes, rather than choice, it can be questioned why
this would be the case for obligations and not for culpability in general, as the choice
theorist  must  argue79.  The  obligation  to  help  someone up who one  has  accidentally
knocked down is a moral one, so there are even moral consequences bestowed upon a
person based on outcome luck.
The part luck plays in this emergence of liability seems easily overstated by the
choice theorist. If the choice made and the outcome are construed as entirely separate
and unrelated entities, it may seem very unfair, but this is obviously not the case. While
it might be true that all we have  complete control  over is the choices themselves, the
outcomes that ensue are not pure luck (Duff 1996: p.342). In most cases, the choices we
make have a bearing on the resulting outcome. Though luck might be a factor, this does
not  prevent moral appraisal  or blame being appropriate  when the outcome an agent
directs  her  choices  towards  comes  about.  Duff  compares  the  choice  theorist  to  the
79 A choice theorist could suggest that liability didn’t track outcome, but this position would require that 
obligations of even apologies weren’t needed in cases like the one above, or that the obligation of an 
apology was present even when there was no pedestrian there to hit, which seems too absurd to take 
seriously. 
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skeptic about knowledge – who holds that just because a remote threat of a peculiar
scenario could compromise one’s ability to form true beliefs – in that they allow the
possibility of the bad situation (an unintended outcome resulting) to compromise an
agent’s credit in the expected situation (Duff 1996: p.332). The natural solution for the
epistemologist might be to accept that where there are no barn-facades,80 one can know
that one is looking at a barn, just like we might say an agent is culpable for the outcome
when it is in accordance with the choices they have made.
Duff  holds  that  culpability  in  general,  like  moral  liability,  is  subject  to  a  more
holistic evaluation. When an agent jumps into a lake to save a drowning child, she is
praiseworthy  even  for  just  trying  to  do  so.  If  she  succeeds,  she  is  even  more
praiseworthy. If, as Duff argues it should be, assigning moral blame is understood as a
social activity,  taking into account effects on other people and one’s standing in the
world (1996:  p.346),  it  is  only natural  that  the outcomes  in  the actual world would
matter to this.
Though  this  is  by  no  means  a  conclusive  argument  against  the  subjectivist,  or
against  choice  theory,  it  is  clear  that  the  way  we  (as  a  society  in  our  appraisals
praiseworthiness  and  blameworthiness,  and  through  our  punitive  practices)  do treat
outcomes as relevant to culpability. In this respect, choice theory, at minimum does not
reflect our attitudes or practices.  A choice theorist  might claim that it  should,  and I
concede that consistent accounts are possible on this basis. However, if an alternative
basis for culpability coheres more easily with our intuitions, there would be reason to
adopt that theory instead. I will now suggest that agency theory accommodates such
intuitions and practices more successfully.
3. Agency theory revisited
Due to its wider interpretation of how culpability is attributed to an agent, incorporating
both the intentions of the agent and the outcome of the action, agency theory easily
80 This position is taken by Alan Millar (e.g. 2010: p.127) among others.
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accommodates  intuitions  of  diminished  culpability  for  attempts.  A typical  complete
attempt, such as the assassination attempt that failed because a passing bird blocked the
oncoming bullet, strongly resembles the paradigm case, but the actual result differs and
so is judged less culpable. 
Though he doesn’t argue for this at length, Horder claims that the agency theory is
unable to account for excuses in law. I disagree. It is unclear why the account of excuses
available to the character theorist  cannot also be utilised by the agency theorist.  An
important  constituent  of  acts  of  responsible  agency is  the  beliefs  or  intentions  with
which one acts. Beliefs that are incongruous with the resulting outcome of one’s action
should be a significant deviation from the paradigm of agency. If an agent temporarily
assists terrorists because he fears for his life81, his beliefs and intentions will presumably
be related to his actions in a different way to the ‘willing’ accomplice of the terrorists.
This  difference  provides  the  basis  for  mitigation  or  exculpation.  In  suggesting  that
agency  theory  is  unable  to  account  for  excuses,  Horder  seems  to  have  a  narrow
conception of agency. When more factors pertinent to the manifestation of agency in
action are taken into account, agency theory seems not vulnerable to his objection and
to have a wide-ranging explanatory power. 
When considered in this way, it seems that agency theory can be thrown back into
the ring. Agency theory will be discussed at length in the following chapter.
4. Building on the foundations 
I contend that arguments for the choice theory of culpability  do  motivate accounts of
recklessness along the orthodox subjectivist direction. I also contend that this does not
accurately reflect  how we view culpability.  It  could  be argued that  this  is  how we
should view culpability – Alexander and Ferzan’s account of criminal liability seems to
follow such lines – but this would result in a wildly different system of criminal law.
81 See R v Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653.
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For  example,  complete  attempts  would  be  punished  just  as  severely  as  substantive
offences.
Horder claims that no unifying theory of culpability is possible, instead favouring
viewing  culpability  as  a  “patterned  mixture”  of  the  capacity,  character  and  agency
accounts. As I have suggested above, I think both choice theory and agency theory give
plausible accounts, but even if we accept Horder’s claim, it can give us significant food
for thought with regards to recklessness. 
Even if what culpability really is, is some mixture of the above concepts, this still
permits  us  to  evaluate  various  accounts  of  recklessness.  The  orthodox  subjectivist
account of recklessness is supported by choice theory, but the objectivist accounts don’t
seem to be able  to  claim any such support.  The direction of  Caldwell  recklessness,
requiring that a risk be obvious according to a reasonable person standpoint, can’t be
justified by any of the above accounts. Consider an example like Elliott v C, wherein a
fatigued girl of low intelligence was deemed culpable for not noticing an ‘obvious’ risk
she would not have noticed no matter how much she thought about it. Such a person is
not defiant; the risk was unknown. Due to such an agent’s capacity, she does not have a
fair opportunity to avoid the harm. Her acts didn’t manifest any bad character trait (as
ignorance  or  stupidity  would  not  suffice  by any character  theorist’s  standards).  Her
action doesn’t resemble anything like the paradigm of responsible agency (because her
intentions  are  so  far  removed  from  the  outcome  that  resulted)82,  so  would  not  be
culpable under agency theory and she did not choose the harm she caused, so choice
theory  would  similarly  exculpate.  Being  unable  to  find  support  from any  of  these
candidates  for  the  grounds  of  culpability  warrants  severe  suspicion  of  objectivist
theories. 
Similarly, several of the ways of dealing with drunken behaviour, such as that of
Caldwell or Faulkner, do not seem to be justified under any of the above conceptions.
Caldwell  recklessness, relying upon a reasonable person standard to decide whether a
risk is obvious, cannot be justified for the above reasons. The possibility of regarding
82 I will later suggest that agency theory can justify the requirement of a belief’s being reasonable  - 
which may be interpreted as reasonable to an ordinary person – but this is not the justification for such a 
clause in the Caldwell verdict.
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self-induced intoxication as its own mens rea level could be argued for under character
theory, as we might suppose that self-induced intoxication (to some degree) manifests a
bad character, but as Rebecca Williams notes, this would merely treat drunkenness itself
as a crime (2013: p.266), which is presumably not a desirable direction.
One concern that we might have is that since 2003, the Sexual Offences Act does
have a “Caldwell-esque” notion of culpability. If, as I have suggested in the preceding
paragraphs, an objectivist  notion has no foundational justifiability,  isn’t  such a legal
provision  entirely  unfair?  In  the  following  chapter  I  will  suggest  that  though  the
objectivist principles are groundless, this particular provision is consistent with agency
theory and its conception of recklessness. 
V. Academic Accounts of Recklessness
Below are  discussions  of  the  two  accounts  of  recklessness  that  were  deemed  most
plausible  by culpability  considerations  in  the  previous  chapter.  Key features  of  the
respective accounts are first presented and explanations of what verdicts they provide in
the  problem  cases  (self-induced  intoxication  cases,  “the  thought  never  crossed  my
mind” cases and “I thought she consented” cases) are given. Criticisms that follow from
each account are discussed and the relative merits of the accounts are compared. Finally,
I suggest that Duff’s account of recklessness is more plausible both as an account that
reflects  what  we deem culpable  and as  an  account  which,  if  accepted,  would yield
legislation more effective in dissuading potential criminals.
Duff’s recklessness
a) Exposition
As noted in the previous chapter,  Duff sees culpability assessments as a target with
concentric circles. If Bob, in his normal state of mind83, throws a knife at Jill because he
83 This proviso is intended to avoid defences such as insanity or heat of passion, which may diminish, or 
eliminate any culpability on Bob’s part. 
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intends to kill her, his actions, if he succeeds, completely fit the paradigm of agency.
Complete attempts fail to resemble the paradigm because the intended outcome was not
achieved. Incomplete attempts are further from the ‘target’, as there are more stages of
the action that the agent has failed to carry out. Just as attempts bear less resemblance to
the paradigm of responsible agency than do substantive offences, so do instances where
the material element of a crime is not intended. If Bob was throwing knives with the
intent of hitting a target he had placed on a door, when Jill happened to enter the room,
his harming her is further from the paradigm of agency.
Duff recognises that recklessness is typically treated as an extension of the normal
paradigm. In the paradigm case, an agent is culpable for the material elements of the
action that she intends and for the consequences that she is certain will be brought about
by her actions. Recklessness is usually (as in any cases of  Cunningham recklessness)
seen as extending this to material elements one realises might be caused by one’s actions
(Duff  1990:  p.141).  Though  this  presumably  would  be  one  way  of  envisaging  an
extension of the paradigm which could serve as a separate mens rea, it is not the route
Duff takes. Instead, he deems practical indifference towards some material element of a
crime as the meaningful extension of the paradigm84.
Exactly what “practical indifference” entails is difficult to articulate. How does this
differ from indifference simpliciter? If there was no difference, Duff’s account would
seemingly  collapse  into  a  character  theory.  What  is  important  for  Duff,  is  that  the
indifference is somehow part of the action. 
In  his  exposition of Duff,  Brady supposes  that  Duff’s  distinction – between the
practical  indifference  required  for  recklessness  and  the  mere  thoughtlessness  of
negligence – involves two categories (1996: p.197). The first category involves actions
that are so inseparable from the harm that  ensues that performing one entails  one’s
indifference. This indifference is manifested by the action. If an agent’s actions fail this
84 Practical indifference was not an unfamiliar notion in discussions of recklessness. For example, it 
featured in rulings dating at least as far back as Derry v Peek (1889), as well as a great many cases since. 
See White (1985: p.108, n.42) for a extensive list of such cases. White himself also argued that 
recklessness was a form of indifference (1961: p.594).
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test, the recklessness is “irrebuttable”. In the second category, Brady notes that practical
indifference can occur when an agent’s conduct “display a seriously culpable practical
indifference to the interests” threatened by her action (Brady 1996: p.198, Duff 1990:
p.172). 
Practical indifference differs from mere indifference in that it can be “read” by the
mere evaluation of an agent’s conduct. Bob, who has been throwing knives at the door
would then be judged as reckless if he has acted with indifference to Jill’s safety (or that
of anyone else who might appear at the door). If he had taken all possible measures to
ensure  nobody was  in  the  house,  put  up  signs  notifying  of  his  activity  or  warned
everyone explicitly beforehand, he would not have been acting indifferently towards
her. If however, he began throwing his knives either without thinking about the possible
risks to anyone else, or having contemplated them but dismissed them without good
cause,  we  would  rightly  deem  him  reckless.  Duff’s  account  captures  both  these
instances.  However,  if  Bob  were  (non-culpably)  rendered  incapable  of  thinking
rationally (by perhaps an unexpected psychological episode or being drugged by some
malevolent third party) and he failed to consider risks to anyone else for this reason, he
might not be deemed reckless. Similarly, individuals of diminished capacity may not be
acting  with  indifference if  they  fail  to  consider  some risk,  as  they  may simply  be
incapable of considering risks the same way we might expect those of normal capacity.
For this reason, this account can avoid some of the problems which haunted Caldwell
recklessness (and do so without resorting to ad hoc provisions). 
Unlike  the  Caldwell  account,  which  admits  of  a  loophole  for  agents  who  have
considered a risk but dismissed it unreasonably, Duff’s account could find such agents
culpable. If Bob were to reason that no one would come in and put themselves in danger
because they usually knock, or for some other bad reason, Duff could explain that he
acts recklessly because if  he had cared enough about the wellbeing of others in the
house, he would have taken care to ensure that no one would enter. That he did not think
to do so manifests a practical indifference. 
Some argue that a person cannot be indifferent to something they haven't noticed (G.
Williams 1982: p.287, White 1985: p.109, Brady 1996: p.193).  This claim is  easily
rebutted. Consider, to borrow an example from Duff, a bridegroom who on the day of
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his wedding, was at the pub with his friends rather than the church where the wedding
was to take place (1990: p.163). The groom hadn’t intended to miss the wedding, but
later explains to the ex-bride that it had “slipped his mind”. 
Duff suggests that if the groom had cared enough about his fiancé, he would not
have  forgotten  the  wedding.  His  doing  so  –  assuming  there  were  no  extreme
circumstances  –  manifests  a  practical  indifference  for  which  he  is culpable.  Any
suggestion that he wasn’t to blame because he forgot would at best be seen as a bad
joke. As Duff notes:
“What I  notice or attend to  reflects  what  I  care about;  and my failure to notice
something can display my utter indifference to it.”
(Duff 1990: p.163)
Usually,  the law will  have nothing to say about an agent’s indifference.  In most
instances, “a detached attitude is not the law’s concern” (Duff 1990: p.162). However,
when such an  attitude  manifests  in  the  form of  actions  that  harm legally  protected
interests, the agent in question is culpable. We can therefore define Duff’s recklessness
as follows.
Agent X is reckless with regards to:
i) A circumstance  when  he  manifests  an  attitude  of  practical  indifference
towards a risk that it exists or will exist.
ii) A result when he manifests an attitude of practical indifference towards a
risk that it will occur.
As Alan White notes in his exposition of recklessness as indifference, an account of
this sort has no issues with the type of cases like the surgeon who (in accordance with
her duty) performs a risky surgery (White 1985: p.101). In such cases, the surgeon does
not act with indifference.  As the surgeon acts  with the motivation of improving the
victim’s condition, she is not acting with indifference, so she is not reckless.
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b) “The thought never crossed my mind” cases
We are now in a position to evaluate Duff’s account with regard to the problematic
cases. The case of an agent who is blind-drunk still proves very difficult85, so the “the
thought never crossed my mind” and “I thought she consented” cases will be dealt with
first. Being practically indifferent is not the same as merely being unaware. An agent
can be aware of a risk and indifferent to it; if Mr Cunningham was aware of the risks to
his neighbour, we would not hesitate in judging him reckless. When an agent is unaware
of the risk, we need to take into account the reason why the agent was unaware, in order
to judge whether they have been reckless. To illustrate how this may be done, we can
consider Duff’s examples of Miller and Denovan and Faulkner. 
As previously mentioned86, Mr Miller attacks a man with a piece of wood with such
force that the man died. Mr Miller claimed that he was so focussed on his activity – that
of attempting a burglary – that he didn’t consider the risks to the victim. Duff says that
in a case like this, what is pertinent is not an “occurrent feeling”, but the “practical
attitude” (1990: p.162). When a person is striking another with such ferocity as to kill
them, failing to apply their latent knowledge (knowledge that hitting someone so hard is
likely to endanger their life) manifests a practical indifference. There is, Duff argues, no
explanation  for  Mr  Miller’s  not  noticing  the  risk  of  his  actions,  other  than  being
indifferent to the life of the victim. As such, it seems we can use the following question
as an indicator: 
If the agent had cared about the legally protected interest, would he have acted as he
did? 
85 In his discussion of recklessness in Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, Duff doesn’t discuss 
whether drunkenness should be allowed to negate the mens rea requirements for recklessness, noting that 
it is a complex issue (p.161), though he does confirm that he sees the Caldwell verdict as mistaken 
(p.206), suggesting that he doesn’t deem drunkenness as negating mens rea requirements.
86 Denovan and Miller is discussed in II.4. 
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In  Miller  and  Denovan, this  test  would  give  the  same  verdict  as  the  Caldwell
account, against what would be seemingly prescribed by the Cunningham account. This
test, however, doesn’t always provide the same results as the Caldwell account. This can
be demonstrated by a case where the test gives the same results as Cunningham, contra
Caldwell:  R v Faulkner87. Mr Faulkner was a seaman on board a boat who intended to
steal some rum from the spirit room. Once in the spirit room he lit a match, so that he
might find the rum he had designs upon, which resulted in his inadvertently burning
down the ship. The risk of spreading a fire by carrying an uncovered flame on a wooden
boat would have been clear to any seamen. To do so in the spirit room, considering the
flammable liquids contained therein, should have been an obvious one to Mr Faulkner,
but he was so intent on his thievery that he did not notice the risk. 
As  the  risk  created  by  Faulkner  was  “an  obvious  risk  that  property  will  be
destroyed”,  by  a  Caldwell  account  he  would  have  been  found  guilty  of  recklessly
destroying the ship, but due to his inadvertence to the risk, the  Cunningham  account
would have the opposite finding. Duff suggests that looking at his conduct, we can see
that  Mr  Faulkner’s  actions  might  not  manifest  an  indifference  to  the  property  he
destroyed, as the risks he imposed upon the ship were serious risks upon his own life
too.  Though the risk of fire in a spirit  room is obvious,  it  is  not  a consequence so
immediate to the act of lighting a match that one could not fail to notice it, particularly
when preoccupied by something (such as Faulkner’s nefarious rum-stealing plans). In
the case of Mr Miller, however, the harm was so immediately and naturally related to
the action that the only way one could perform it without awareness of the risk is to be
indifferent to the well-being of the victim.
The use of this  test  in  cases where an agent  fails  to  become aware of a  risk is
supported by comments made by Lord Goff, in his comments regarding the Elliott v C
verdict:
“Where no thought is given to the risk any further inquiry necessary for the purpose
of establishing guilt should prima facie be directed to the question why such thought
was not given.”
87 R v Faulkner (1877) 13 Cox C.C. 550.
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(Elliott v C, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 939)
The solution Duff offers is that recklessness is only established if the explanation
why no thought was given was (at least in part) practical indifference. In  Elliott, the
minor of low intelligence who while fatigued had inadvertently set fire to a shed would,
by Duff’s lights, only be found reckless if her actions manifested practical indifference.
Given her psychological state at the time of the crime, it is not clear that her actions
display any such indifference.
c) “I thought she consented” cases
The ‘I  thought  she consented’ cases  proved difficult  for  Cunningham and  Caldwell
advocates to  provide satisfactory verdicts,  but Duff’s writings about  sexual offences
provide a plausible solution which is justified by his account of recklessness88. In order
to see what should constitute the fault element in the crime of rape, Duff considers the
nature of the crime itself. 
“The essence of the crime of rape is that it constitutes a serious attack on a woman’s
sexual interests and integrity: the fault element in rape should, therefore, consist in a
serious disregard or disrespect for her sexual interests and integrity.”
(Duff 1990: p.169)
This disregard or disrespect can be manifested whether or not the agent is aware that
the woman does not consent. It is clearly displayed when a man has sex with a woman
knowing she doesn’t consent, or when he proceeds without concerning himself at all
whether or not she consents. It also seems that the same disrespect and disregard is
manifested by the man who has sex with a woman while believing for no good reason
88 Duff wrote most specifically about this in “Recklessness and Rape” (1981), though he also discusses 
the subject in several other places, including Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), Criminal 
Attempts (1996).
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that she consents; if he did care, he would not have been so easily convinced. In such
cases, it is clear that the woman does not consent, and that the man does not “notice” or
is too busy indulging his own gratification to question the circumstance despite clear
signs of reluctance demonstrates his indifference.
The  ruling  given in  Morgan  and  Cogan,  therefore  seems mistaken.  Even  if  Mr
Cogan did honestly believe that Mrs Leak consented, he shouldn’t have, considering the
overwhelming evidence that she did not. His readiness to accept the highly implausible
scenario as actual demonstrates that he didn’t really care about her consent. Even with
the claim that the intoxication contributed to his mistaking the facts, he still acted with
practical indifference contrary to the nature of consensual sex, thus is reckless as to her
consent.
The only situations in which one may have committed the actus reus for rape – sex
with a non-consenting party – and not be culpable in doing so, by Duff’s lights, are
when one reasonably believes in the consent of the other person. Such a situation would
be very rare and bizarre, as in normal situations a lack of consent would be blatant and
thus would be acknowledged by anyone forming their beliefs reasonably. A man might
reasonably believe that a woman consents if, unbeknownst to him, she has been coerced
to go along with it by some third party. Another possible scenario, suggested by Baron,
would be one in which a survivor of chronic sexual abuse in childhood believes that a
man she is with will abuse her, despite no indication of this by the man89. Because of her
previous experiences, she believes that if she resists, the ordeal may last longer or be
more  painful,  and that  refusing  would  be  pointless  or  dangerous.  The  woman then
pretends that she wants to, or doesn’t mind, even though she is unwilling. As she is a
good actress, the man notices nothing wrong in the situation, and proceeds to have sex
with her. 
Situations  like  this  would  be  very  unusual,  but  would  exculpate.  In  all  other
situations, when the actus reus for rape occurs, the charge of rape would stand. This
89 This example is modified from an example provided by David Archard, who depicts a man who looks 
similar to an escaped psychopath who resorts to brutal violence if he doesn’t get his way. A woman, 
believing he is the psychopath, acts as though she consents so as to avoid being brutalised (Archard 1999:
p.216, cited in Baron 2001: p.16). 
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account also provides helpful answers to practical worries about the demandingness of
proving the msn rea requirement. A defendant could not be exculpated by creating a
small amount of doubt among jury members about whether he was (for bad reasons)
unaware  of  the  non-consent.  This  alleviates  the  concern  that  alleged  rapists  would
escape conviction by claiming they thought the woman consented, as they would still be
found guilty unless their belief is deemed reasonable. Duff thus determines that only
reasonable belief of consent can exculpate in “I thought she consented” cases. 
As mentioned previously90,  the 2003 Sexual  Offences Act  does require that men
charged with rape  have good reason to  think a  woman consented  if  they are to  be
exculpated. While I noted that this ‘objectivist’ requirement had no clear foundation,
Duff’s account elucidates this. It is because the man who goes through with a sexual act
without  good reason to believe the woman consents  acts  in  a way that  manifests  a
practical indifference that he is culpable. 
d) Blind-drunk cases
As so often is the case, ascertaining whether or not an agent has manifested a practical
indifference and thus is reckless requires attention to the circumstances. Consider cases
involving self-induced intoxication, where the intoxication blinds one to a substantial
risk, or renders it difficult to see the risk as substantial. Taking a hard line, it could be
suggested that becoming intoxicated is reckless in itself. As becoming intoxicated alters
a person’s inhibitions so that drunken individuals might risk certain legally protected
interests, anyone who does commit a crime in such a state has manifested their practical
indifference in becoming so drunk as to commit the crime91.  As Dressler notes, “the
effect of alcohol and drugs on the human body is now sufficiently well known that the
law may assume that when an ordinary person chooses to ingest intoxicating substances,
90 See IV.4.
91 If the agent would have committed regardless, then the intoxication need not be taken into 
consideration as a factor.
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he  knows  that  he  will  suffer  temporary  impairment  of  his  powers  of  perception,
judgment and control; therefore, he knows that he will jeopardise the safety of others
while  in  that condition” (Dressler 1995: §28.03 [B] [2]).  This reasoning concerning
drunken crimes can lead to self-induced intoxication being regarded as not only not
permissible  as  a  defence,  but  also  enough to  suffice for  criminal  recklessness.  This
rejection of the use of self-induced intoxication as a defence is used in Scots law92. Any
action that would have been seen as reckless by a sober person could then be judged
reckless when committed by a drunken person. 
However, this seems to fail to capture something important (particularly in light of
the agency theory of culpability), something that Duff’s account does capture. Consider
the following example. 
Susan returns home from a party where she became very drunk. Upon reaching her
house, she sees that the next door neighbour is lying on the floor in his living room93.
Thinking  that  her  neighbour  has  taken  ill  and  possibly  in  urgent  need  of  medical
attention, she quickly breaks a window and bursts in. However, the neighbour was only
setting up a mousetrap or looking under a table. If Susan was sober, she would have
knocked on the window, called to her neighbour or looked more closely, but because of
her intoxication she panicked and acted hastily. 
Normally,  an  agent  in  Susan’s  position  would  have  at  least  an  excuse  defence
available against any charge of criminal damage94, but if intoxication is not allowed to
constitute part of a defence, this might not be possible. Though Susan clearly made a
mistake about the facts of her environment, she certainly wasn’t practically indifferent;
she acted with the aim of helping her neighbour. As she wasn’t practically indifferent to
92 In Brennan v HM Advocate, the accused’s acute self-induced intoxication was deemed to be sufficient 
mens rea even for a murder conviction ([1977] J.C.51), which has received significant criticism (i.e. Stark
2011). 
93 This particular example adapted from one provided by Duff in Answering for Crime (2007: p.271).
94 Duff notes that actually such an agent may be acquitted in English law, as belief in a lawful excuse is a
defence under the Criminal Damage Act that does not require a belief to be justified (Duff 2007: p.293).
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the criminal damage, under Duff’s account she was not reckless. Considering examples
like this, a rule imputing appropriate mens rea based on intoxication seems incompatible
with Duff’s recklessness, as well as the agency theory of culpability as a whole.
Cases  such  as  the  above  instance  suggest  that  self-induced  intoxication  can  be
evidence that the agent was less culpable, so that evidence should be permitted as part
of a defence. It is not obvious, however, that all offences should permit such defences.
Mistake-of-fact  “defences”95 which  coincide  with  instances  of  self-induced
intoxication, as those argued in Morgan and Cogan are very problematic. I have already
argued that the intoxication in Morgan and Cogan does not exculpate, but this might not
hold in all mistakes due to intoxication. An alternative mistake-of-fact case is Jaggard v
Dickinson96. In this case, the defendant, Ms Jaggard had intended to stay at the house of
a friend, Mr Heyfron. Jaggard had permission from Mr Heyfron to treat his property as
she would her  own. After  a  night  of  drinking,  Ms Jaggard took a  taxi  to  what  she
thought was Heyfron’s house. Unbeknownst to her at  the time, she had arrived at a
nearly identical house on the same road. Ms Jaggard proceeded to break two windows
in order to gain entry to the house, believing at the time that she had permission.
The crime of criminal damage to property is deemed a crime of general intent, so
following the Majewski verdict, mistake-of-fact due to self-induced intoxication would
not seem to exculpate. However, the judgment was challenged, as the Criminal Damage
Act 1971 specified that “it  is  immaterial  whether a belief  is  justified or not if  it  is
honestly held”. Upon appeal it was decided that the belief didn’t need to be justified. As
the belief that she had permission to use the property in this manner was honestly held,
she could use this as a defence. That the belief was formed because of her intoxication
did not change this97.
95 Technically, a claim of mistake-of-fact is not a “defence”, as it is a type of failure-of=proof claim, 
which is not a true “defence” (Dressler 1995: §24.01 n.4).
96 [1981] Q.B. 527
97 Ibid. p.528
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The essence of the crime of criminal damage is that it constitutes a threat to the
property of others. For Duff’s account, whether or not Ms Jaggard was reckless depends
on whether or not she was practically indifferent to the damage. Yet someone who uses
someone else’s property under the mistaken belief that it’s theirs is not indifferent to the
property.
Though we would probably argue that Ms Jaggard was culpable in some respect,
and is liable to replace the damaged property, she does not act with indifference. In this
case, Ms Jaggard’s failure is to take care, not a failure to care. She made a mistake and
one  that  she  would  not  have  made  had  she  been  sober.  However,  her  conduct  in
damaging the property was not indifferent. With these considerations in mind, for some
crimes,  mistake-of-fact  claims  should  be  available  for  defendants  acting  while
intoxicated. Ms Jaggard seems to be an instance of someone who was civilly liable, so
is  responsible for paying for the damages caused by her actions,  but not criminally
liable. Duff’s account is easily able to accommodate this interpretation.
As the above examples suggest, it might be a mistake to attempt to regard all crimes
similarly with regard to whether or not self-induced intoxication can be used as part of a
defence. In some situations, like Jaggard v Dickinson, intoxication does seem to provide
an  explanation  for  a  mistake-of-fact.  In  those  cases  acting  in  accordance  with  that
mistaken belief does not reveal a practical indifference on behalf of the agent. In other
cases, such as Morgan and Cogan, the mistake-of-fact does entail an indifference upon
the  part  of  the  agent.  The  Majewski  ruling  makes  a  similar  claim,  but  makes  the
distinction based upon crimes of basic or specific intent98. As both of these crimes are
regarded  as  ones  of  basic  intent,  but  only  one  seems  criminally  culpable,  making
distinctions on whether a crime is of basic or specific intent seems unhelpful. Duff’s
account, however, is able to offer a plausible distinction between these cases. Through
his account, Duff illustrates that it is both possible and desirable to distinguish between
offences which should permit mistake-of-fact defences, and which should not. 
98 This distinction is previously discussed in III.1. 
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2. Criticisms of Duff’s account
Though the methods described above do provide satisfactory resolutions to many of the
problematic cases, there are still several criticisms of Duff’s account. In this section I
will address two particularly pressing concerns.
 (a)The definition of recklessness can be criticised as eclectic and wildly dissimilar
to both everyday and conventional  legal  usage (Gardner  and Jung 1991:  p.561).  Its
utilisation in explaining certain cases might then seem ad hoc, and it might be wondered
whether the attitude Duff describes as recklessness is actually appropriate for purposes
of a culpability category.
(b) Norrie argues that Duff’s account relies upon peculiar and unfair notions of what
constitutes  the  essence  of  an  offence.  If  there  is  no  systematic  way for  this  to  be
uncovered, the account relies upon potentially arbitrary views of what the nature of a
given crime is.
a) An ad hoc mens rea categorisation?
One may wonder why practical indifference forms the clear mens rea category that Duff
supposes  “recklessness”  to  serve.  One  could  argue  that  that  though  acting  with  a
practical indifference towards some legally protected interest is culpable, it  is surely
more culpable if one realises one is doing so. If one is more culpable for taking some
risk  when  aware  that  that  risk  exists,  why shouldn’t  there  be  a  mens  rea  category
between practical indifference and knowledge? 
Brady argues  that  there is  a  conceptual  distinction  between crimes involving an
awareness of risk and those with a “mere” practical indifference (1996: p.193). Instead,
he  favours  a  Cunningham-like  account  of  recklessness.  On  this  view  practical
indifference without awareness of risk should suffice only for negligence. In supporting
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his position, he accuses Duff of ignoring important conceptual considerations because
of a supposed equivalence of blameworthiness between situations. For example, when
Duff gives the example of Miller and Denovan, he argues for Mr Miller’s recklessness
by claiming that while hitting the victim with the plank of wood unaware of the risk, he
acts with the same indifference to the victim’s well-being as the agent who is aware.
Brady claims that it is a mistake to think that merely because Mr Miller was just as
culpable as he would have been if  he considered the risks of his  conduct that both
instances belong in the same conceptual category.
Gardner  and  Jung  also  claim  that  Duff  does  not  motivate  the  position  that  his
recklessness is the obvious conceptual mens rea category denoting a level of culpability
below knowledge. They also suggest that his definition of recklessness coheres neither
with the “everyday concept” nor with any “existing legal definitions” (1991: p.561).
An advocate of the choice theory of culpability would be unlikely to be persuaded
by Duff’s  account  of  recklessness,  but  even  if  one  endorses  the  agency  theory  of
culpability, we might question why practical indifference is the category of culpability
below knowledge. In the paradigm cases of responsible agency the agent aims at some
criminal end and accomplishes this. Surely the person who is aware that this criminal
aim may obtain resembles the paradigm more closely than one who does not.
In defence of Duff, we might consult Alan White’s writing on recklessness. Though
White  did  not  have  the  commitments  to  agency  or  the  possibility  of  recklessness
without foresight of risk, he also characterised recklessness by the attitude of practical
indifference. White analyses recklessness as an ordinary language concept. If White’s
everyday concept of recklessness can be reconciled with Duff’s (which seems plausible
given their shared reliance on practical indifference) and White motivates the place of
recklessness as the mens rea level below knowledge, the same argument can be made on
Duff’s behalf.
White argues that recklessness is an attitude. Actions by an agent with that attitude
are also correctly described as “reckless”, as is the agent performing such actions. The
attitude  of  recklessness  is  a  specific  form  of  indifference.  Not  all  indifference  is
reckless, as one can be indifferent towards a piece of music or towards the plight of
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some endangered species one has never heard of, though these are certainly not reckless
attitudes (White 1961: p.594). Indifference is the attitude of “the man who does not
care” (White 1961: p.592). 
We  can  justify  these  claims  by  referring  to  ordinary  language.  As  with  other
attitudes,  one  can  feel reckless,  but  recklessness  cannot  be  “exercised”  or  “used”.
Recklessness can serve as an explanatory factor in behaviour; a person can drive too fast
because of their recklessness. A person can feel reckless even when not acting. These
considerations  distinguish  recklessness  from  carelessness.  It  would  be  peculiar  to
describe  oneself  as  feeling  “careless”99.  These  concepts  may  be  conflated  because
carelessness is often due to and “evidence of the not caring which is indifference,” the
hallmark of recklessness, but recklessness and carelessness are clearly different (White
1985 p.101). An agent accidentally knocking over friend’s cup of tea while she passes
the sugar is careless, but obviously not necessarily reckless. And obviously she need not
be indifferent; she might be mortified and extremely apologetic at having done so. In
doing so, she exhibits a failure of attention, rather than a failure of care.
Considering  this  point,  we  may  revisit  Brady’s  criticism,  that  Duff  mistakenly
ignores an important conceptual distinction based on an equivalence of blame in some
examples (like Mr Miller and the bridegroom). When discussing mens rea levels, it is
the fault element that is pertinent. The comparison between Miller, and a similar agent
who does think about the risk of harming (or killing) his victim is illuminating because
the fault element of these agents is the same. The fault element is the culpable attitude
manifested in the agent’s conduct. Because this attitude is the fault element, and that
attitude is present in both Mr Miller and his counterpart who considers the risk, both are
properly assigned in the same conceptual category.
Gardner  and  Jung’s  criticism can  be  responded  to  similarly.  Though  a  mesh  of
mental states may fall into what Duff labels the attitude of “recklessness”, they are all
characterised by the same fault element; manifesting a practical indifference. This is the
pertinent factor which unites a various agglomeration of situations Duff wishes to call
99 They may describe themselves as “carefree”, or “without a care”, but these phrases indicate a lack of 
worry, rather than a lack of care (White 1985: p.93). 
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“reckless”. That it does not cohere at all with either the legal or everyday definitions
could also be questioned: Alan White came to a similar account of “recklessness” by
analysing ordinary language, so this surely isn’t entirely divorced from everyday usage.
The role of indifference in relation to recklessness is  also well-documented in legal
thought.100 
Even if the above argument is accepted, and it is accepted that both the advertent
and  inadvertent  agents  that  fall  under  Duff’s  umbrella  of  “recklessness”  do  form a
natural category, it might still be thought that the cases wherein the agent is aware are
more culpable. Perhaps this notion of recklessness is a natural concept, but levels of
culpability are better captured by replacing recklessness with two categories, with the
advertent agent in a more culpable mens rea level. A similar formulation was considered
in the  1985 Code,  giving the name “recklessness” to  instances  where an agent  was
aware of a risk, and calling “heedless” an agent who gives “not thought to a risk that
“would be obvious to any reasonable person”101.
If we consider this alternative to Duff’s method, we may see further wisdom in his
approach.  There  could,  instead  of  the  mens  rea  category  of  recklessness,  be  two
categories102:
1) Foreseen risk-taking.
2) Practical indifference.
Proof of foreseen risk-taking would, as in the MPC hierarchy of categories, suffice for
offences that only required culpable indifference. This would address the concern that
100 Supra, n.84. 
101 1985 Code, 8.22. The element of “heedlessness” was removed for the 1989 Code.
102 The Israeli criminal code does have an idea like this, but both “rashness” – the “assumption of an 
unreasonable risk as to the possibility of the consequences hoping that it will be possible to prevent them”
= and “indifference” are seen as types of recklessness, which is a mens rea category below “intention”. 
Both of these notions of recklessness would presumably be covered by Duff’s notion of “practical 
indifference”, so would result in a hierarchy similar to Duff’s proposals. (Penal Law of Israel, quoted in 
Simons: 2003: n.5).  
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the man acting with the awareness of the risks of his illicit conduct is more culpable
than the one who is unaware (though still culpably indifferent).
If such a hierarchy were adopted, Duff’s concerns about recklessness and rape could
be accommodated by making the lower category the required mens rea for rape. This
would also allow the law to accommodate Brady’s thought that the agent who does
foresee the risk is more culpable, and this could be reflected by harsher sentences for
those in who take a foreseen risk than for those who commit offences with “mere”
practical indifference.
If,  however,  this  new  hierarchy  were  adopted,  it  would  suggest  that  –  without
extenuating  circumstances  – the  foreseen risk-taking is  always  worse  (for  the  same
offence, at least) than culpable indifference without foresight of risk. I would like to
question this  based on two examples.  Firstly,  consider  the man who has sex with a
woman, noting the possibility (estimated at  p%) that she doesn’t  consent.  It  doesn’t
seem that there is an ordinal difference in culpability between this man and the man
who, like the character, Arrogant (referred to in III.3) assumes consent and refuses to
accept any evidence to the contrary. This is particularly evident when p is a very low
percentage, say 0.001%. It might even appear that Arrogant is more culpable due to his
extraordinary unwillingness to accept the situation. Though it is not possible to assign a
number to the culpability of the respective agents, it is clear that within a category there
are different gradations of culpability; taking a very high risk, all things being equal, is
worse than taking a low risk. It would be undesirable, however, if for a given offence, a
“lower” category of culpability often seemed more culpable than a “higher” category103. 
A  second  example,  courtesy  of  George  Fletcher,  concerns  the  Ford  car
manufacturer’s  production of the Pinto (Fletcher 1998: p.116). The Pinto was designed
in such a way that the gas tank was likely to explode on fairly common, light impact,
such as a very slight rear-end collision. Consider (without attention now to what did in
fact  happen)  two  possible  versions  of  what  happened.  In  one  instance,  the  car
manufacturer  does  not  consider  risks  of  this  design,  due  to  “sloppiness  and
103 Ferzan and Alexander (2009) and Simons (2003: p.196) do suggest that this occurs in the current 
categories already, however, this contention is disputed in V.3. 
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indifference”.  In  a  second version  of  the  case,  the  company runs  thorough  tests  to
evaluate  the  risks,  but  decides  that  the  risk  is  not  substantial  enough  to  warrant
assuming additional costs104. This decision is later decided to be reckless, as the risk is
deemed by a judge to be very substantial indeed, and the company mistaken in their
assessment. Although we might think Ford callous in the second instance, that they have
evaluated the risk at all indicates some concern for the public. It might be the case that if
the risk was even slightly higher, they would have withdrawn the model. In the first
version,  however,  the  risk could  have  been much higher,  but  because  the  company
didn’t conduct any evaluation, it would still have gone unnoticed. Fletcher suggests that
the first version of this example would make Ford more blameworthy, yet a hierarchy
placing foreseen risk-taking as more culpable would suggest otherwise (as would the
MPC definitions). 
Examples such as these,  which would indicate culpability levels contrary to any
amended  hierarchy  (with  foreseen  risk-taking  above  practical  indifference)  provide
indirect reasons to adopt Duff’s simpler hierarchy, with recklessness (manifesting an
attitude  of  practical  indifference)  below  purpose  and  knowledge.  Given  that  some
evidence suggests that ordinary people struggle with understanding the current mens rea
categories anyway105, one might wonder how beneficial it would be to split the mens rea
hierarchy even further, even if clearer culpability categories were available. 
This criticism of Duff’s account is unconvincing, as his notion of recklessness does
not, upon further inspection, appear as eclectic as several critics suggest. Dissecting a
mens rea hierarchy even further also seems undesirable,  due to the difficulty of the
project (for both those making the categories and the jurors who would have to make
the  distinctions).  Restricting  the  hierarchy  further,  though  appearing  simpler106 also
104 Incidentally, this is a further example that would fall into a Caldwell loophole, as the risk was 
considered, yet dismissed as not substantial.
105 This was noted in a recent article by Francis Shen et al. (2011), which cites considerable confusion 
regarding the difference between recklessness and knowledge (p.1354). 
106 Dolinko praises Alexander and Ferzan’s account for this virtue – calling it “refreshingly novel” 
despite arguing that it inevitably fails (2012: p.98). 
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seems plagued by problems. As Dressler points out, distinctions like those in the MPC
hierarchy are important to “express the moral gradations of culpability that exist” (2000:
p.963). 
b) Arbitrary view of a crime’s essence
Alan Norrie claims that though Duff’s account is able to provide desirable consequences
only if we rely upon very specific ideas about what constitutes the essence of a crime.
Moreover, he suggests that what Duff views as constituting the essence of a crime is
wildly different to what the ordinary person thinks. Therefore, Norrie suggests, Duff’s
view of what suffices for a crime may rely upon arbitrary ideals and prove unfair to
non-experts who would be unfamiliar with these notions.
To illustrate his criticism, Norrie takes Duff’s analysis of the essence of rape. As
discussed in the previous section, Duff says sex is “essentially a consensual activity
between partners” (1990: 169). The man who believes unreasonably that a woman is
consenting has made a mistake about “something which is (which should be) essential
to his intended action, since without her consent” he is engaged in a “perverted, because
non-consensual  distortion  of  that  act”  (still  Duff  1990:  169).  As  such,  not  being
sufficiently careful towards the woman’s integrity is reckless, so the agent is guilty of
reckless rape.
Norrie claims that Duff bases his account of rape and its essence on judgements
about the crime of rape and value judgements of sex as “a matter of deep emotional
sharing  rather  than  objectivized  physical  satisfaction”  (1992:  p.51).  He  argues  that
though this sentiment might be shared by many of us and is preferable to alternatives,
large parts of the sexist society that we are part of do not share such views. Many of
those who would be found guilty by Duff’s lights would be of differing views, so would
not see themselves as acting criminally. As Duff requires “an evaluation of reasonable
sexual conduct” which may differ from the “actual attitudes of unenlightened men”,
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Norrie contends that the account “cannot meaningfully be said to be anything to do with
their actual, concrete subjectivity” (1992: p.52).
There are several concerns related to this criticism. One such concern is that what
constitutes  an  offence  is  arbitrary  or  reliant  on  niche  value  judgments.  This  would
clearly  count  against  the  theory.  Rather  than  a  careful  investigation  of  universal
concepts, the analysis of a crime would require a specific, privileged set of values and
an interpretation of events also influenced by one’s values. This would be unfair  to
those without such values and thus undesirable. 
One might attempt to respond to this with the legal doctrine that ignorance of the
law is no excuse. This, without further qualification, seems inadequate, as it contains
nothing to indicate why an agent acting with such ignorance would be culpable. If the
laws  are  completely  arbitrary  and  an  agent  breaks  them  without  knowing,  that
information in itself isn’t enough to ground an agent’s culpability. Fortunately, I will
argue, Norrie is mistaken in such claims. 
Any legal system protects certain interests. All citizens are required to ensure that
their behaviour does not harm these interests. In our legal system, the sexual integrity of
any  citizen  is  one  such  interest.  Norrie  cites  misogynistic  men  as  examples  of
“unenlightened” people holding different values. He claims that requiring “reasonable
sexual  conduct”  from  such  people  “may  be  politically  acceptable  but  cannot
meaningfully  be  said  to  be  anything  to  do  with  their  actual,  concrete  subjectivity”
(1992: p.52). Even “unenlightened people”, however, will have some understanding of
sexual integrity; they will probably value their own. 
If Duff’s account were reliant on some of the claims Norrie indicates, his argument
might be convincing. However, the interpretation Duff offers of sex as “deep emotional
sharing” is not required for one to respect the sexual integrity of others. One might
regard  sex  as  an  informal  activity  between  acquaintances  or  as  a  means  for  one’s
individual  pleasure  (like  a  massage)  and  still  respect  the  autonomy  of  the  other
party/parties. All Duff’s account actually requires in this matter is that an agent respects
the choices of others with regards to whether or not they wish to use their bodies in a
certain way. If their conduct manifests a practical indifference to the sexual integrity of
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others, they are culpable for doing so, and as this is a legally protected interest, they are
criminally culpable.
It might be a matter for public communication to relay exactly what interests are
protected to help inform such “unenlightened” people exactly what conduct is required.
However, such conduct is still required. As Marcia Baron argues, 
“…public education may very well be needed to get out the message that this is
required. But that means that education is needed, not that because the education isn't
offered, we should not require the conduct. The fair warning requirement is a reason to
give the warning, not to abandon plans to require the conduct.” 
(2001: p.9)
The actual requirements of agents are fairly minimal. In  Morgan or  Miller  –type
cases, their offences would have been prevented if they had acted with respect for the
legally protected interests of others. Ensuring that a partner is consenting or that one
doesn’t hit another with sufficient force to risk his life are very minimal requirements.
These can be seen by anyone who does value others’ sexual autonomy or well-being; by
anyone who is not practically indifferent to them. For any agent to have so little concern
that  his  actions  could  cause  such harm makes his  causing  the  harm culpable.  It  is
difficult to conceive how someone interpreting their environment (including the actions
of the “partner”) could make a mistake in such a situation unless they exemplify an
astounding lack of care (in which case we would deem them culpable) or suffered from
some  diminished  capacity  (in  which  case  a  diminished  capacity  defence  could  be
available107).
Norrie’s criticism also relates to the criticism of the reasonable person standard. He
concedes that when an agent acknowledges that his conduct was wrong and when the
interpretative audience agrees (when society also judges the conduct wrong), there is a
consensus and the agent is thus culpable. A reckless driver, realising that their driving is
107 Under Duff’s account some form of diminished capacity defence must be available, as an agent of a 
diminished capacity may not be indifferent, but just unable to appropriately react. As this would clearly 
affect the resemblance of the agent’s action to the paradigm of responsible agency, it must also affect the 
agent’s culpability.
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wrong, can justly be punished. Without this consensus, however, as when a driver thinks
(erroneously) that he is driving safely, the agent is being held to standards he didn’t
know of, and possibly could not meet.
Duff insists that recklessness is a subjective notion, even under his account. This is
because an agent’s recklessness “consists in his own practical attitude of indifference…
an attitude  he  displays  in  his  conduct” (Duff  1990:  p.172).  The reckless  agent  acts
callously or indifferently. Norrie suggests that to make the account truly subjective, it is
necessary to find some way to determine whether the agent did act with indifference
rather than “negligence, stupidity or thoughtlessness” (Norrie 1992: p.54). 
To  illustrate  the  criticism  more  clearly,  consider  A,  who  has  committed  some
offence.  As  this  is  an  offence,  it  is  something  deemed  wrong  by  the  interpretive
audience (society,  in the form of  the law).  The agent,  A,  may have adverted to  the
material element that constitutes the offence, or she may not have. Either way, she may
acknowledge  afterwards  that  she  acted  with  practical  indifference,  or  she  may not.
Norrie accepts that in the cases wherein “it should be possible to gain the accused’s ex
post facto  agreement that what she had done did display practical indifference”,  the
agent has acted recklessly (1992: p.55)108. When no such consensus exists between the
agent and interpretive audience, however, Norrie suggests that the disagreement is one
of value-judgments, and politically motivated. Thus in such cases, agents would be held
culpable for possessing different values. This criticism of the use of the reasonableness,
which Norrie later describes as a “political rabbit in the judicial hat”, is slightly different
to the criticism described earlier109 as  it  focuses  on the values rather  than cognitive
ability of an agent. This criticism – as well as the related criticisms of the reasonable
person standard – is likely to warrant a response from defendants of all accounts of
108 It should be noted that despite Norrie’s wholesale criticism of Duff’s conclusions, he does accept that
an agent can be reckless despite inadvertence to a risk.
109 See III.4. 
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recklessness110 (as well as for various other aspects of criminal law), so this shall be
returned to later.
3. Alexander and Ferzan’s recklessness
a) Exposition
Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan have claimed that the entire legal system
has vast flaws and propose a serious remodelling111.  They make several bold claims
about how the law should be adjusted. One of the most controversial claims they make
is that there should only be one mens rea category: recklessness. They see this category
as very similar to the MPC version of recklessness, though argue that the requirement
that the risk be substantial is unnecessary. 
That one can be reckless without taking a  substantial risk is a matter which has
some support from previous authors112. In support of this claim, they consider examples
where the probability that a risk will obtain is very small,  but extremely unjustified.
They compare “Driver”, who upon noticing that a passenger is having a heart attack
speeds to the nearest hospital in order to get his passenger the treatment they need with
agents  like  Daniel,  who  likes  to  “set  dynamite  on  city  streets  just  for  the  thrill  of
watching the dynamite  explode” (2009:  p.26).  They imagine that  the risk of  Daniel
110 Any account that holds the falling short of some minimal objective standard of conduct as a keystone 
of recklessness will do so. The Cunningham and Caldwell accounts do explicitly. The MPC talks of “the 
standard of conduct a law-abiding citizen would observe”, but this description does not avoid the 
problem. 
111 Most of the claims attributed in this section to Alexander and Ferzan are made in Crime and 
Culpability (2009). Though Stephen Morse is also credited as a contributor, his influence is difficult to 
ascertain. For simplicity I shall refer to this position as Alexander and Ferzan’s.
112 Dressler (2000: p.957) suggests that the “substantiality” should be read with regard to the 
unjustifiability of the risk, rather than to the probability of the risk. Simons makes a similar point (2003: 
p.189, n.30). 
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causing injury or death by this is 1% of the risk caused by Driver, but still suggest that
Daniel is reckless, whereas Driver is not, because his conduct is justified.
This is the only change Alexander and Ferzan see as required to the definition to the
MPC definition  of  recklessness.  They still  require  of  recklessness  that  the  conduct,
considering the circumstances known to the agent, “involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding citizen would observe in the actor’s situation”
(2009: p.25). As Baron notes, the “law-abiding citizen” requirement seems puzzling, as
it  seems  uninformative  and  potentially  circular  (2001:  p.26)113,  but  Alexander  and
Ferzan do explicitly endorse it (2009: p.43) This doesn’t seem too problematic, as long
as it is interpreted as requiring some appropriate standard of conduct, though this clause
might have been edited to clarify the definition.
Any recklessness is constituted by two axes; the degree of risk imposed and the
reasons for doing so (2009: p.24). The degree of risk axis denotes the probability the
risk will obtain as perceived by the agent, and the harm that risk would occur.  The
reasons axis is also required, as the agent must be acted unjustifiably in order to be
deemed reckless. As they demonstrate with the cases of Driver and Daniel, a significant
risk might be reckless if there are no good reasons for acting (exploding things for fun),
but not reckless if there are good reasons (trying to get an ill person to hospital).
Crimes currently classed as purposely or knowingly committed are obviously still
culpable,  but these are “folded” into recklessness (2009: p.31).  In the purposeful  or
knowing case, an agent would risk the interests of others and her reasons would not
justify her behaviour, just as in the reckless case. In doing so, they provide examples of
purposeful  and  knowing  crimes,  and  claim  that  they  necessarily  exhibit  the  same
properties required by their definition of recklessness. 
When considering purposeful crimes they consider assassins who attempt to kill a
political  figure  for  financial  gain.  However  likely  they  are  to  succeed,  they  have
unleashed a risk against a protected interest and have done so without good reasons. As
Alexander and Ferzan have dispensed with the “substantiality” requirement,  the risk
113 Moore and Hurd also draw attention to this phrasing (2011: p.333).
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could be very small. They consider the case of “Cowardly Jackal” who shoots at his
target from a great distance, realising that the chance of his success is only one in a
million (2009: p.35). Alexander notes that an agent acts purposely even when the odds
are  so tiny,  as  long as  they believe  their  activity increases  the  risk of  harm (2000:
p.942). He is still unjustified and the risk (though low) is still a risk, fulfilling both the
axes of recklessness. 
A similar analysis is available for knowledge. In the case of offenses committed
knowingly an agent has a “practical certainty” that the risk imposed will be satisfied. As
long as the reasons for imposing the risk are unjustified the offense is still, by Alexander
and Ferzan’s definition,  reckless. Offenses committed knowingly or purposefully are
then just special forms of reckless.
Incorporating  knowingly  and  purposefully  committed  offenses  into  recklessness
avoids two theoretical problems114. It “allows us to avoid the error of deeming all cases
of  knowledge  to  be  worse  than  all  cases  of  recklessness”  (2009:  p.33).  Alexander
illustrates this with the example of a person who imposes a practical certainty of harm
another  for  a  “quite  weighty  but  ultimately  insufficient  reason”  (Alexander  2000:
p.940), who he suggests is far more culpable than an agent who imposes a very high –
but short of practical certainty – risk for frivolous reasons. The former case would be
classed as knowingly committed according to the MPC, whereas the latter would be
reckless, which Alexander sees as making an erroneous culpability distinction.
The other problem resolved by recognising only one mens rea level is that wilful
blindness doesn’t require an ad hoc treatment. Instances of wilful blindness occur when
an agent does not have knowledge that they are committing an offense, but only because
of deliberate avoidance of evidence that would provide them with such knowledge. This
type of case often occurs in the case of agents who take steps to ensure that they do not
gain knowledge that they are actually transporting drugs or other illicit materials across
national  borders.  Often,  smuggling  illicit  substances  is  only  punished  if  done  so
knowingly, so if the agent avoids knowledge, she would escape prosecution. Alexander
114 These are cited in Crime and Culpability (2009: pp.33-35) as well as in Alexander’s “Insufficient 
Concern” (2000:940-942)
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notes  difficulties in  several American cases wherein courts  have contrived to  find a
defendant  guilty by finding their  “wilful  blindness  to  be  tantamount  to  knowledge”
(2000: p.941). Alexander argues that it would be preferable to avoid this unnecessary
distortion, which a singular mens rea category of recklessness would. There would be
no issue in finding the wilfully blind agent reckless, as she certainly takes an unjustified
risk. The level of punishment that is appropriate would be a function of the probability
she deems of the risk obtaining and how unjustified the conduct was. 
Alexander and Ferzan firmly reject criminal liability for negligence,  basing their
position on the choice theory of culpability. If there is no culpable choice made then
there would be no justification for criminal liability. They demonstrate their conviction
in this account by means of an example they understand might seem very troubling,
calling it the “strongest counterexample” to their position (2009: p.77). Sam and Ruth
are  a  “self-absorbed  yuppie  couple”  with  a  young  child.  They  also  happen  to  be
throwing a party which both hold very important to their social standing and careers.
While drawing a bath for their child, the doorbell rings signalling the arrival of the first
guests. At the time, both reason that there is plenty of time to welcome the guests and
return upstairs to turn off the bath. They proceed to greet the guests, “both realizing that
the child would be in grave danger if they failed to return and turn off the water, but
both believing correctly that at the rate the tub is filling, they will have plenty of time to
return to the child after they have welcomed the guests.” Once downstairs, however,
both Sam and Ruth,  distracted by the guests,  forget  about  their  child,  who drowns.
Alexander and Ferzan hold that if negligence was ever culpable, this would be one such
instance. They reject this though, arguing that though Sam and Ruth are not “morally
attractive” people,  they did not believe they were taking a risk,  so are not culpable
(2009: p.78). The thought had slipped their minds and “once the thought was out of
their minds, they had no power to retrieve it.” 
The culpable choice, under this account, is one that “unleashes a risk of harm over
which he no longer has complete control” (2009: p.19). Agents who still have complete
control whether or not they unleash such a risk are deemed non-culpable. Consequently,
certain  offences  which  are  currently  illegal,  such  as  solicitation,  conspiracy  and
incomplete attempts (where an agent takes some steps to commit a crime, but falls short
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of actually unleashing a risk) would be deemed non-culpable. It should be noted that
minor risks may be unleashed in the process of what would normally be considered
incomplete  attempts.  For  example,  if  carrying  a  gun  with  the  intention  of  killing
someone, an agent has already unleashed the risk that he could drop the gun or fall in a
peculiar way, and with no good reason. Even act of driving is reckless if it is with the
intention is to another person’s house to kill them (or even fraudulently enter an exam),
as this risk – though admittedly low – is completely unjustified (2012: p.286).
The culpable choice need not be a  conscious one.  In order to  account  for cases
where an agent indulges in risky activity, while having a vague risky feeling but without
having considered  the  ramifications  fully,  Ferzan draws  from her  work on “opaque
recklessness”. When a risk is fully considered – when the risks have been noticed and
acknowledged by the agent – but the agent still takes it, she is “purely reckless” (Ferzan
2001:  p.603)  or  “transparently  recklessness”  (Alexander  and  Ferzan  2009:  p.51).
Opaque  recklessness  occurs  when  an  agent  knew  her  “conduct  was  ‘risky’  or
‘dangerous’ but failed to advert to and consciously disregard the specific reason why”
(2001: p.599). 
Ferzan considers a driver who runs a red light while in a hurry and hits a pedestrian.
When running the light, the driver only had the notion that she was taking a risk. In her
original paper, Ferzan expresses concern that the MPC definition of recklessness would
not include any such driver, as it requires that a risk is “consciously disregarded”, even
though such an agent should be classed as reckless. Alexander and Ferzan suggest that
the opaquely reckless agent is “oftentimes just as culpable as when she is fully aware of
the risk” (2009: p.51). 
To justify this they draw upon Michael Moore’s discussions of consciousness and
culpability115, which distinguish conscious awareness from preconscious awareness. The
preconscious is “the domain of routine actions that have become so habitual that we
need not focus on them but can, when necessary, call them to mind” (2009: p.51). An
agent who is driving may have delegated many of the actions to her preconscious. She
will  not have to actively think what  the pedals do,  what the lights signify or about
115 See Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law (1993). 
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general rules of the road. When opaquely reckless, such an agent has the  conscious
awareness that “this is dangerous”, but she does not probe any further. What makes the
conduct  dangerous  lies  within  her  preconscious.  If  she  was  asked  what  made  her
conduct dangerous,  she would “immediately rattle  off  reasons” (2009: p.52).  As the
reasons were available to the agent, and her conscious awareness gave her reason to
consider those reasons, the agent is judged to be just as culpable as the purely reckless
agent (2009: p.58).
When there is no awareness of the risk, the agent is not signalled to consider the
dangers, so has no internal reason to. So the initial feeling of recklessness is necessary
for  the  agent  to  actually choose to  take  the  risk.  If  a  risk is  merely located  in  the
preconscious,  the  agent  is  like  a  negligent  agent,  with  “no  power  to  retrieve”  the
knowledge required to advert to the risk, thus is non-culpable. 
Another pertinent feature of Alexander and Ferzan’s account, in keeping with the
choice  theory of  culpability,  of  which  they are  staunch advocates,  is  that  complete
attempts are deemed just as culpable as substantial offences. Results have no bearing
upon an agent’s culpability. This does fly against common moral evaluation. As Duff,
notes116 we ordinarily will blame someone more if they succeed in harming us or our
interests. Lacey criticises Alexander and Ferzan’s position in this regard, arguing that
despite its “pleasing conceptual neatness”, it is unsatisfactory considering “the centrality
of harm to the reactive attitudes which underpin our practices of praising and blaming,
including our current practice of criminalization” (Lacey 2011: p.636). 
Alexander and Ferzan see themselves not as “biting the bullet” in this position, but
challenge  their  opponents  to  provide  a  compelling  argument  for  why results  matter
(2009: p.173). They provide an example wherein we watch video footage of an agent,
who decides to commit a murder, buys a gun, waits for his victim to arrive, then shoots
at her.  At that moment, the video is paused (2009: p.172). We then, ignorant of the
outcome, are asked to evaluate the blameworthiness of the agent. As choice theorists,
they hold that his choices and acting on those choices is the sole determinant of his
culpability. Any feelings of additional blame we may have towards him if his victim
116 Discussed in IV.2. 
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should die might be explicable by moral psychologists, but these would be in error, as
once he has unleashed the risk, his culpability is set. 
b) Blind-drunk cases
With the pertinent features of this account in mind, we can now evaluate how it can
accommodate the problem cases. The blind-drunk cases are dealt with very differently
by Alexander and Ferzan because a blind-drunk agent who is unaware of the risks they
are imposing upon others is not culpable. As long as they have not unjustifiably chosen
to impose a risk, they are not reckless. However, in many of these cases Alexander and
Ferzan will find fault in earlier conduct of these agents, deeming them reckless, but
locating the recklessness at the moment they unleashed the risk of harm. 
Alexander and Ferzan explicitly deal with self-induced intoxication amongst their
claims  that  results  do  not  affect  culpability  (2009:  pp.191-2).  They  consider  three
would-be drunk-drivers. Joe, John and Jake all get equally drunk of their own volition
and decide to drive home. Joe fails to get to his car, passing out in the parking lot. John
manages to drive his car in his intoxication and drives dangerously, but arrives home
without  incident.  Jake,  however,  tries  to  drive  home,  and  because  of  reduced  risk-
awareness, collides with a car, killing those inside. 
For Alexander and Ferzan, what is pertinent to the culpability of these agents is the
“ancestral culpable act”, namely their choosing to drink without surrendering their keys
in the first place (2009: p.191). They name this “genetic recklessness”, as the harmful
conduct is the result of the “ancestral culpable act” (2009: p.58). If an agent acts in a
certain manner at T1, that creates “for insufficient reasons, what the actor perceives as a
risk of harmful conduct at T2, then the actor acted recklessly at T1, irrespective of what
occurs thereafter  (2009: p. 59).” Consequently, under this account Joe, John and Jake
are all equally culpable. 
To illustrate  how the account  would determine culpability,  we may consider  the
blind-drunk  case  of  Caldwell. The  degree  which  James  Caldwell  should  be  found
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culpable, under this account, would be dependent on his evaluation of the risks of his
conduct. By his own testimony, he did attempt to burn down the hotel owned by his
former employer – so he would certainly be culpable for arson – but was, due to his
intoxication, unaware that he might endanger lives by doing so. Even accepting that
Caldwell had no awareness that his conduct was endangering lives when he started the
fire,  Alexander  and  Ferzan’s  account  may  still  find  Caldwell  culpable  for  this
endangerment,  but  to  ascertain  his  culpability  a  jury  would  need  to  inquire  about
whether he committed an “ancestral culpable act”. If Caldwell himself realised that he
was in a temper when he began drinking, and that he would risk causing harm to legally
protected interests, then he would be culpable. Just how culpable Caldwell – and those
in a similar position would be – would depend upon “the average riskiness the actors
believe such conduct entails” (2009: p. 192). A similar level of culpability would attach
to any actor who decided to get drunk, knowing that this could lead to his harming of
legally protected interests.
It follows that intoxication could potentially be used as a defence117 against a wide
range of  offences.  Any mistake of fact,  in which an agent  mistakenly – due to her
intoxication – thought there was no risk could mitigate her actions, or exculpate her
completely if  her becoming intoxicated in the first place was non-culpable.  Such an
agent  would  not  be  culpable  for  becoming  inebriated  if  she  failed  to  consider  any
reasons why becoming inebriated  could cause harm, or  if  she had considered some
harms but (justifiably) judged them to be either negligible, outweighed by some benefits
(like her enjoyment, which may outweigh certain risks of imposing harms if those risks
are low enough) or mitigated by some other of her actions (such as giving a friend her
car keys, perhaps). 
Alexander and Ferzan also allow for intoxication to mitigate culpability in cases
when an  agent  is  aware  but  provoked,  inasmuch  as  it  serves  to  impair  the  agent’s
rationality  (2009:  p.162).  As  being intoxicated  may make it  more  difficult  to  resist
provocation, it acts as a “partial defeater” to culpability. It is supposed, however, that
the aggregation of the initial culpability for recklessly drinking (drinking while aware
117As noted in n.87, this would not strictly be a “defence”, but a failure-of-proof claim.
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that this will lead to an increased risk of being easily provoked) and the culpability for
choosing to act upon provocation (even though this is mitigated to some degree by the
difficulty of resisting provocation) will usually add up to the same level of culpability as
it would if the intoxication were not permitted to mitigate (2009: p.167). 
If the total culpability will usually be the same in these cases regardless of whether
intoxication is considered to mitigate, it might be wondered what benefit this has. There
are two noteworthy practical upshots of this. First, it becomes possible to find someone
reckless for getting drunk when he has a temper he knows may lead him to act violently,
even when he fortuitously avoids a violent confrontation. Perhaps we could consider a
man  with  a  history  of  drunken  violent  conduct,  whose  drinking  in  the  first  place
unleashes a risk over which he no longer has full control. 
Secondly, this two-fold account of culpability in these cases helps explain why it
might be desirable to be lenient towards first time drunken offenders. Rebecca Williams
discusses the difficulties posed by the fact that a large amount of alcohol-related crimes
are  committed  by first-time  offenders  (2013:  p.264).  If  many of  these  agents  were
unaware that alcohol would have this effect on them, or estimated their susceptibility to
this as much lower than it in fact was, this account would deem them less culpable.
Alexander and Ferzan note, that though such an agent “will be less culpable the first
time he does so…he should only have one bite at this apple” (2009: p.167).
For  any agent  who is  intoxicated  while  committing  an  offence,  the  question  to
determine her culpability depends upon any culpable choices she has made. Her choice
may occur at the time the harm is caused, but if she is blind-drunk – so inebriated she is
unable to appreciate the risks of her conduct – her culpability will be dependent upon
whether there is an ancestral culpable act. Such an act would require that she realised at
some point that she was taking a risk in drinking or continuing to drink, and yet decided
to take the risk. The essence of this account is also applicable to cases of “epileptics or
psychotics failing to take their antiseizure or antipsychotic medications” and many other
cases of genetic recklessness (2009: p.192). 
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c) “The thought never crossed my mind” cases
Due to the nature of Alexander and Ferzan’s account, genuine “the thought never
crossed my mind” cases are easy to evaluate. If an agent never considered that there was
a risk the agent is not culpable. Because of the intricacies of the account, however, this
will apply to far fewer cases.
In Miller and Denovan, for instance, though Mr Miller may have not thought about
the possibility of killing his victim at the time, he presumably would have had some
reckless feeling, some underlying feeling that his behaviour was “risky” or “dangerous”.
Though he may have acted upon this without fully probing his preconscious to discover
the exact risks, Ferzan’s account of opaque recklessness will still deem him culpable.
Additionally, Mr Miller would also have to answer for putting himself in the position
wherein he may have to attack intervening parties. It seems highly probable that when
he and his partner decided to commit a robbery, they were aware that they could pose
significant dangers to the wellbeing of others – as well as the property they intended to
steal.  Consequently,  both  Miller  and  Denovan  would  be  culpable  for  the  “average
riskiness” they believed their conduct entailed.
When absolutely no thought is given to the risk, however, and no lingering “risky”
feelings arise in the agent,  that agent is  non-culpable.  Among such cases, we might
consider Faulkner or Elliott v C. If Faulkner was truly so obsessed with stealing the rum
that the risks of lighting a match in the spirit room were not apparent to him, he would
be non-culpable for that118. As with the example of Sam and Ruth, the couple who forget
their child in the bath, we may judge that Faulkner is not a morally attractive character
for acting as he did, but if he did not notice the risk, he had no “internal reason” to
advert to it, thus, on this account, is non-culpable. 
Similarly, in Elliott v C, the defendant, being fatigued and of low intelligence may
plausibly have had no sensation of risk when she played with matches near the white
118 In fact, Mr Faulkner would probably be deemed non-culpable even for robbery under Alexander and 
Ferzan’s account, as, assuming he had not yet stolen the rum or deliberately broken anything in his 
efforts, he would not have considered himself to have unleashed a risk beyond his control.
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spirit. Though she would probably have realised that she wasn’t allowed in the shed she
had broken into, the harm she would have been able to foresee from her doing so would
have been minimal. She was also seeking shelter, which may have excused any minimal
risks she would have actually foreseen. Even if  not,  it  is  unlikely that her doing so
would have constituted a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding
citizen would observe” in her situation, so Alexander and Ferzan would probably deem
legal intervention inappropriate (2009: p.87). 
Evaluating recklessness in this way overcomes the dangers that plagued  Caldwell
recklessness, of unfairly criminalising the behaviour of those of low intelligence. 
d) “I thought she consented” cases
Cases where a mistake about consent is made may result in the most counter-intuitive
verdicts under Alexander and Ferzan’s account. In cases like  Morgan  and  Cogan, all
that is required of defendants in order that they be exculpated is a genuine belief in
consent. When this is combined with the position that mistakes-of-fact made because of
intoxication are not culpable (any more than the original intoxication itself), this seems,
at first glance to find non-culpable a wide range of conduct that we might think should
warrant severe punitive action.
Perhaps this cursory analysis is too quick to dismiss the tools available to Alexander
and Ferzan’s account.  We might  suppose that genetic  recklessness could once again
come into play. Particularly when the agents are intoxicated, as in Cogan and Morgan,
the agents may have considered before beginning drinking that they could participate in
some improper conduct once drunk. However, it would be very peculiar for a man at a
bar  while  ordering  his  first  pint  to  consider  the  probability  of  sexually  assaulting
someone  if  he  gets  drunk.  A man  who  had  committed  some  sexual  assault  while
intoxicated before might think about it, but it seems very odd to locate his recklessness
at this point. Additionally, Alexander and Ferzan’s suggestion that such an agent should
“only have one bite at the apple” would seem wildly inappropriate in the case of not
considering the possibility of making drunken mistakes about consent.
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Genetic  recklessness  doesn’t  seem  able  to  provide  a  satisfactory  solution  here.
Perhaps the recklessness of such an agent can be found in any moment of doubt that is
not properly treated. Alexander and Ferzan provide an example of a man who drives
home from work, realising when he arrives at his driveway that his brakes are soft and
that it would be reckless to drive with them again in that condition. This man, knowing
he is  prone to  forgetfulness,  resolves  that  he must  write  a  note  for  himself  to  read
tomorrow. If he then omits to write that note – deciding perhaps to take his shoes off
and have a cup of tea first – even if he does in fact remember the next morning, he is
reckless  in  doing  so.  The  only  exception  to  this  is  if  the  man  is  not  culpable  for
forgetting to write the note. Alexander and Ferzan suggest that he might be distracted by
news of a family crisis, which would put the thought out of his mind, in which case he
would not be culpable for failing to write his reminder (2009: p.80). 
By this same reasoning, we might conclude that any man is reckless who does not
appropriately deal with an awareness of risk. If Mr Cogan had some doubts when Mr
Leak first said that his wife wanted to have sex with him, but did not respond to them
appropriately, he might then be culpable. It is unlikely that once such a thought was in
his mind it could be forgotten for any good reason. “Good reasons” are ones that do not
display “insufficient concern for others’ welfare” (2009: p.81). By analysing the prior
conduct that led to the offence, some recklessness might be uncovered rendering the
agent culpable. 
It might be retorted that a man in this position would simply deny any awareness of
risk. In such a situation,  they would probably be susceptible to the “hot-time in the
witness box” Glanville Williams referred to (1988: p.77) and it would be for the jury to
decide  whether  or  not  the  claims  were  true.  Under  this  notion  of  culpability,  this
decision must take place, as the presence of absence of any awareness is the dividing
line between the culpable and the non-culpable. If a man genuinely had no idea that the
woman wasn’t consenting (and this isn’t because of some ancestral culpable act), this
account finds him innocent. 
As Alexander and Ferzan criticise the use of reasonable person standards, citing it as
arbitrary, they can make no use of this. As a consequence, no matter how unreasonable
the inferences made by an agent are, they are not culpable. If the belief of consent is
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genuine  –  and  is  held  throughout  the  agent’s  conduct  –  the  agent  cannot  be  held
criminally accountable. 
4. Criticisms of Alexander and Ferzan
Crime and Culpability has attracted a large amount of criticism119. In this section, I will
address some of these criticisms, focussing on those directly concerning their account of
recklessness and its consequences120.
a) What are the benefits of a unified conception of criminal culpability?
When  Alexander  and  Ferzan  attempt  to  justify  their  reclassification  of  mens  rea
categories to only count recklessness they try to explain how cases of knowledge and
purpose can be “unpacked” into cases of recklessness (2009: p.31). Obviously, when
knowing and purposeful offences are included, the account of “recklessness” fails to
track any normal usage of the word; a meticulously planned offence would not be called
“reckless”. What is important is whether this amended categorisation is beneficial in
assessing culpability.  
Clearly, if there was only one mens rea category, this would be more parsimonious,
but that in itself cannot warrant the manoeuvre. It might be thought that several mens
rea categories, which capture differing degrees of culpability – as is the status quo -
better characterise moral intuitions121. Dolinko (2010: p.98) and Cornford (2010: p.344)
119 This is testified to in the many reviews of the book. Susan Bandes (2010), Andrew Cornford (2010) 
Michael Corrado (2010),David Dolinko (2010), Nicola Lacey (2011) and Kenneth Simons (2010) all 
review the book, with most being very critical.
120 Consequently, I will not discuss many of the criticisms made, such as of the 
retributist/consequentialist tensions in the book (i.e. Simons 2010: p.557) or the omissions of various 
important arguments (noted by Lacey (2011: p.636), Cornford (2010: p.345).
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suggest that the wrongdoing of purposefully or knowingly committed offences might be
of a distinctive type and consequently warrant different treatment.
One argument that Alexander and Ferzan make for regarding recklessness as the
only  mens  rea  category  is  that  this  avoids  the  mistake  of  “deeming  all  cases  of
knowledge to be more culpable than all cases of recklessness” (2009: p.33). It is unclear
from the literature who they see as making this mistake, as no authors are mentioned122.
This  alleged  mistake  could  be  understood  in  two ways.  Either  it  is  the  mistake  of
suggesting that every offence committed purposely is more culpable than every offence
committed recklessly. This ‘mistake’ is so  clearly  false that it  is difficult to imagine
anyone would make this claim: someone who knowingly litters a minimal amount is
obviously less culpable than the reckless rapist or the extremely reckless driver. 
Alternatively, the mistake they refer to may be that of suggesting that purposefully
or knowingly committed offences are always more culpable than reckless offences of
the same kind. This is a much more substantial claim, but they offer no arguments for it.
The example they provide attempts to demonstrate that they can account for a difference
in culpability in accordance with the standard MPC mens rea hierarchy, but involves
offences of different sorts – Albert, who defends his life’s work by inflicts severe injury
on someone who would otherwise destroy his life’s work, and another agent who drives
like a madman. As the example can only support the trivial claim, that some crimes
recklessly committed can be more culpable than some knowingly committed, it is not
particularly  effective,  or  threatening  to  the  status  quo  of  the  traditional  mens  rea
hierarchy. 
The current hierarchy does seem to capture important culpability distinctions. We
might consider an example courtesy of Kenneth Simons, wherein Larry and Kim both
want to kill some innocent person. Both have equally malign reasons for doing so, but
while Larry is happy to shoot his victim point blank to ensure his result is attained, Kim
121 As previously noted, this is suggested by Joshua Dressler (2000: p.963). 
122 David Dolinko expresses doubt that the mistake suggested is made by the conventional approach 
(2010: p.98). 
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wants a challenge so shoots from further away, estimating her chance of success at only
30% (Simons 2010: p.564). In current systems, both would (if they succeed) be guilty of
a purposeful homicide. In Alexander and Ferzan’s account however, as recklessness is
simply “a subjective concept that tracks the defendant’s assessment of the risk” (2009:
p.31),  and  Kim’s  assessment  of  the  risk  she  imposed  was  drastically  lower,  her
culpability would also be drastically lower.  How can this  be accounted for  without
deviating from the culpability calculus Alexander and Ferzan adhere to?
Perhaps Alexander and Ferzan would argue that the only pertinent fact is the choice
that shows insufficient concern. Within their account endangering a legally protected
interest is more culpable the more certain the risk is and the more unjustified it is given
the actor’s reasons. Thus, acting with the goal of harming one such interest and with
certainty that one could do so is the most culpable an agent could be for a given offence.
Differences in culpability can be distinguished in this way, without any distinctions for
judgments  about  the type of motivation for the conduct.  It  might  be suggested that
though we would evaluate Larry and Kim as equally culpable, this is a confusion to
which we are susceptible because of the way the actions affect our blame attributions,
much  like  the  suggestion  that  psychological  explanations  account  for  (supposedly)
mistaken beliefs that results affect culpability (2009: p.187). This might be successful,
though  it  would  be  a  much  more  satisfying  response  if  some  explanation  for
commonplace misconceptions about major culpability distinctions were given. 
Alexander  also  suggests  that  the  presence  of  wilful  blindness  as  an  anomaly is
avoided by their unified conception of recklessness. He provides an example of a drug
smuggler who employs 100 “mules”, each of whom is given a suitcase, of which only
one contains the drugs. Each of the mules would evaluate the risk of their carrying the
drugs at 1%, so it would be absurd to suggest that the one carrying the drugs knew they
were smuggling drugs. Alexander claims that though the risk taken by the smuggling
mule is a paradigmatic instance of recklessness, because knowledge is required for a
smuggling prosecution in many jurisdictions, courts contrive methods to find call this
“knowledge” (2000: p.941). 
The wilful blindness doctrine is not as strong as Alexander needs for his argument to
succeed. It merely states that a special type of recklessness in a circumstance is just as
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bad as acting with knowledge. To undermine the MPC’s mens rea hierarchy, he would
really need an example of a reckless action that was more culpable than any instance of
acting with knowledge. Alexander might complain that the requirement for knowledge
in smuggling is inaccurate if wilful blindness would suffice, but that is not an issue that
would compromise a ranking of knowledge above recklessness.
Alexander  and  Ferzan  cite  two  benefits  of  their  unitary  conception  of  criminal
culpability.  Neither,  without  substantial  further  justification  motivates  their  radical
reconception.  Despite  these  concerns,  if,  as  they  claim123,  this  account  was  more
successful in achieving justice, it might still be preferable to the status quo.
b) Problems of opaque recklessness
The notion of opaque recklessness124 allows Alexander and Ferzan’s account  to find
culpable agents who have only a vague awareness of the dangers they impose. If all that
is needed is a vague awareness of a risk for one to be culpable for all the risks one
would be aware of had they consciously thought about it, this allows prosecution of the
impulsive reckless driver, as well as the problem case of Miller and Denovan discussed
by Duff. As long as Mr Miller had known that there was some risk to his behaviour, he
could  be  culpable  for  the  full  gamut  of  risks  that  he  would  have  realised  he  was
unleashing had he given it his full attention.
Though  it  is  certainly  necessary  to  find  such  agents  culpable,  upon  thorough
examination, this seems to have the undesirable effect of pulling apart the culpability
distinctions  Alexander  and  Ferzan  so  adamantly  deny.  To  illustrate  this,  consider
Ferzan’s driver, who while in a rush decides to cross a yellow light knowing that it will
turn red before she gets there (Ferzan 2001: p.597). The driver only had a fuzzy notion
123 Alexander and Ferzan claim this at length in Crime and Culpability and have continued to do so more
recently (2012: p.286).
124 Discussed in V.3a)
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of the risk. She had not planned to unleash this risk upon the world. We might even
suggest that if she had properly considered this risk, she would have refrained. It seems
this agent who was opaquely reckless is much less culpable than an agent who, after
calculating the risks, decides to unleash this risk (or perhaps wants to unleash it). 
We could also consider  Jonathan and Yuri,  who have the same conscious “risky
feeling” which they ignore. If Jonathan had consulted his preconscious, he would have
noticed only a minor risk. Yuri, however, through various research, has placed himself
in a superior doxastic position and would be aware of more dangers that would ensue
from his conduct125.  As the culpability of an opaquely reckless agent is evaluated as
proportional to the risk he would have noticed if he had consulted his preconscious, Yuri
would be deemed much more culpable. This is despite the fact that Jonathan and Yuri
went through the very same conscious decision-making process. This seems contrary to
Alexander and Ferzan’s views of moral luck, as the “red flag” of the “risky feeling”
could in an otherwise identical situation, have been a false alarm. 
Alternatively, if an agent dismisses a “risky feeling” without considering it, should
she  not  be  culpable  for  an  entire  range  of  dangers  that  “risky feeling”  could  have
signalled? Presumably the vagueness of such phenomenology could be explained by a
number  of  dangers.  If  she  is  culpable  for  reactions  to  conscious  stimuli  only,  the
comments concerning genetic recklessness would suggest that she should be culpable
for  imposing the  average  riskiness  she  would  have  estimated  that  could  have  been
signalled by this risk.
A broader interpretation of the agent might resolve this difficulty. If the conscious
and the preconscious are considered as a whole in the evaluation of a person’s conduct
(as must be the case for the opaquely reckless agent to be culpable) then the agent who
would have been aware of more risks would rightly be judged more culpable. However,
if  it  isn’t  just  the  conscious  process  of  the  agent  that  is  evaluated  when  assessing
culpability, why should the negligent agent – who has preconscious awareness, but no
risky feelings – be exculpated? 
125 This example would have the same effect under Alexander and Ferzan’s theory if Yuri merely had a 
collection of false beliefs which would have made him think the conduct more risky that it actually was, 
but didn’t consult them.
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Simons also finds opaque recklessness problematic, particularly citing the difficulty
in individuating risks in the preconscious. If an agent is driving a car and has a “dim
awareness  that  she is  doing something dangerous”,  yet  continues,  this  is  enough to
suffice for recklessness, but “what level of risk has she consciously created?” (Simons
2010: p.572-3). Simons supposes that the preconscious risk caused by running a red
light could be due to the “preconscious belief that she will merely smash into a parked
car” or that she might “kill a pedestrian”, and that worryingly, there may actually be no
determinate answer to what preconscious belief caused her to feel that she was acting
riskily. 
Perhaps these worries can be assuaged if we imagine the driver was culpable for
exactly and only the risks she would have noticed had she thought about them. This
would  result  in  an  analysis  similar  to  conditional  subjectivism  interpretation  of
Caldwell  recklessness126, though it would require conscious awareness of some risk in
the first place. It might be questioned whether or not even an analysis of this sort would
be consistent with Alexander and Ferzan’s program. In addition, this would certainly
raise the sort  of worries that Lord Diplock had of  Cunningham recklessness,  that  it
requires a jury to make a “meticulous analysis…of the thoughts that passed” into the
mind of the defendant127. Setting aside the evidentiary burden of proving the original
awareness,  the difficulty of  ascertaining  what  risks  the  agent  would  have  perceived
upon consulting her  preconscious  would be astounding.  Regardless,  if  these are  the
distinctions that serve as the dividing line between culpable and non-culpable,  these
judgments must somehow be arrived at, and it is not a fault of the theory that this may
be difficult.
c) Could genetic recklessness really work?
126 This evaluation is discussed in II.6, and was the interpretation of Caldwell recklessness favoured by 
Glanville Wiliams.
127 Caldwell, pp.351-2
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In order for an agent to be culpable due to his “genetic recklessness”, an agent would
have to acknowledge at the time of committing the supposed reckless act, that he was
committing a risk. Does it not wildly misconstrue the dangerous drunk to suppose that
he considers, upon buying his first pint, that it might lead him to become less resilient to
provocation, thus unleash a risk upon the general public? Alexander and Ferzan suggest
that “many folks are on notice that when they drink they get into fights, become hot-
tempered and so on” (2009:  p.166),  so their  drinking is  culpable  (regardless  of  the
result).  The agents will also be culpable for actually getting into fights, should they
make choices to do so while intoxicated, though the culpability for these choices would
be mitigated if the alcohol is deemed to have reduced their ability to resist provocation. 
Merely because agents do have the latent knowledge that they are likely to start
brawls if they are to get drunk, it doesn’t follow that they will consider this. If agents do
not consider the risks when they drink, their culpability is less than it would be had they
considered the risks while drinking. It certainly seems questionable whether this should
reduce their culpability. If a man gets into fights a lot when he drinks, surely he should
reconsider getting drunk. Alexander and Ferzan acknowledge that someone who realises
they possess a potentially dangerous character trait may have a duty to correct it (2009:
p.85) but their account – and any account requiring choosing to endanger the interests of
others – cannot accommodate this without somehow  making the agent aware of this
duty. His first drink of the day, when not thinking about potential risks (even opaquely),
is merely negligent, so not culpable. 
One consequence of this account might involve notifying agents likely to act in a
way that would increase their likelihood of imposing risks at opportune moments. This
could be in the form of warnings in bars to alert potentially violent drunks that their
drinking  might  itself  be  reckless  (particularly if  they have  a  history of  violence  or
haven’t surrendered their car keys), thereby ensuring their awareness.  It would still be
extremely  difficult  to  prove  genetic  recklessness  and  hold  culpable  agents
accountable128, particularly as most cases would not lead to actual instances of harm, but
128 Alexander and Ferzan’s “moderate retributionism” only holds that punishment for wrongdoing is a 
good, not that it is necessary, particularly if doing so would require vast resources, so the theory would 
not require overly demanding prosecutions (2009: p.8).
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this approach could be successful in providing specific events of awareness that could
be pointed to.
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VI: The Reasonable Person Standard
In the previous chapter, I suggested that both of the academic accounts presented are
able to provide verdicts  for the three problem cases and explain how they relate to
criminal  culpability.  I  have  suggested  that  Duff’s  account  is  more  congruous  with
everyday  moral  intuitions  and  is  better  able  to  respond  to  various  criticisms  that
Alexander and Ferzan’s account. The major difficulty I found with Duff’s account was
its  reliance  on  reasonableness  considering.  Norrie’s  criticism  –  that  the  nature  of
reasonable  person  standards  requires  that  “unenlightened”  people  are  judged  by an
unfair value system – proved particularly problematic. Alexander and Ferzan’s account
aims to avoid that problem by dispatching entirely of the ordinary person standard. The
avoidance of the reasonable person standard might be seen as a major point in favour of
their account over Duff’s.
In this chapter, I shall first demonstrate that despite their assertions to the contrary,
Alexander and Ferzan still rely on a notion of reasonableness (or at very least, some
equivalent  concept  that  carries  with  it  the  same  issues),  before  arguing  that  these
problems  should  not  and  must  not  be  allowed  to  negate  criminal  culpability.
Consequently, taking into account culpability concerns and overall plausibility, Duff’s
account is superior.
1. Why Alexander and Ferzan still need reasonableness
For  Alexander  and Ferzan,  the  essence  of  culpability  is  insufficient  concern,  which
entails  “choosing  to  take  risks  to  others’ legally  protected  interests  for  insufficient
reasons” (2009: p.67-8). This is embodied by (and only by) an agent’s recklessness,
which is a function of: 
1) the degree of risk the actor believes he is imposing on others’ interests
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2) his reasons for doing so.
(2009: p.24)
Already, questions of standards arise. There is some standard from which one must
deviate (or grossly deviate) in order to satisfy the requirements for recklessness. By
what  standard  is  the  concern  demonstrated  by  an  agent’s  conduct  insufficient?
Alexander and Ferzan ardently criticise the use of the reasonable person in the actor’s
situation (2009: p.81), so some other standard must be intended. They regularly refer to
the MPC qualification of a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding
citizen would observe in the actor’s situation” (2009: pp.25, 43, 315 my italics). They
also refer to gross deviation from “what the ordinary citizen, with ordinary concern for
others, would do” (2009: p.314). 
How can it be fair to measure someone against the “law-abiding person” standard?
The term itself is vacuous if no one abides the law. Must a citizen apprise herself of the
conduct of non-criminals in order to meet this standard?
Perhaps Alexander and Ferzan would claim that the unfairness they point to only
applies when holding agents accountable for risks they have not noticed. This, however,
seems unsatisfying. If their complaints about the reasonable person standard are taken
seriously, there is no non-arbitrary method to hold someone accountable in accordance
with some objective standard, so this must apply to the degree to which their conduct
deviates  from some objective  series  of  norms which  the  agent  may or  may not  be
properly acquainted with.
The apparent problem of judging an agent’s conduct by some objective standard is
parallel in both the negligent agent who should have been aware of some risk, and the
reckless  agent  who  should  have realised  that  his  weighing of  values  was mistaken.
Consider the following arguments:
1) The unaware agent, A, has belief set B. Belief set B contains no beliefs about the
riskiness of F, where F is some fact A is responsible for. Alexander and Ferzan
suggest  that  the  only  non-arbitrary  interpretations  of  the  reasonable  person
standard involve considering whether A would have noticed the risks of F if he
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was 1) an omnipotent epistemic agent (one who knows all the facts that relate to
the decision) or 2) an agent with the exact beliefs that A did in fact have (2009:
p.82). If the omnipotent agent, Z, is to be considered, one is culpable for every
risk one did not notice relating to one’s conduct, which is clearly far too strong.
If  the equivalent agent with the same beliefs, A*, is considered,  the agent is
never culpable129. 
2) Similarly,  we  can  consider  the  agent,  A,  who  grossly  deviates  from  some
objective  standard,  but  believes  he  is  acting  in  accordance  with  it.  From
Alexander  and Ferzan’s  arguments  from non-arbitrariness,  we could  suppose
that the only plausible standards we could assess him by are those of 1) an agent
who knew all the relevant facts about what standard he was held to, or 2) an
agent who held all the beliefs that A actually held. If the first interpretation is
used, every agent who acts on mistaken beliefs about the standards of society is
culpable. If the second interpretation is taken, no agents who act in accordance
with mistaken standards are culpable. 
Alexander and Ferzan accept the first  of these arguments,  but  reject  the parallel
second argument. The second argument – given that they claim these are the only non-
arbitrary ways to counterfactually compare belief sets – would apply to any standard an
agent’s conduct could be measured against, as it makes no mention of reasonableness,
only of standards.
Simons suggests that the motivation for permitting the first of these arguments but
not the second is the fact-law distinction (2010: p.581). According to this, one is not
culpable for mistakes one holds about the facts they believe, but is culpable for mistakes
they make about the laws that govern them, including what justifications can legitimise
certain conduct. Interestingly, agents holding inappropriate values (those mistaken about
the objective standard required of their conduct) can cause them to have faulty beliefs.
129 Referred to in III.4
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Simons notes that the yuppie couple, Sam and Ruth, were only unaware of the risks to
their child because of their abhorrent values (2010: p. 581). If an agent is culpable for
the values they hold when weighing up risks, why should they not be culpable when
those values cause them to fail to notice risks?
Alexander and Ferzan never justify this distinction, but merely claim that this seems
to be a presupposition of our practices of blaming and praising” (2009: p.153, n.76).
Regardless  of  what  justification  could  be  available  to  them,  some  notion  of
reasonableness (or an equivalent notion to fill the same role) is required in relation to
values, in order for an agent to determine what reasons can justify behaviour130.
2. A defence of the reasonable person standard
An odd feature of Alexander and Ferzan’s argument against the reasonable person
standard is the assertion that the only non-arbitrary ways to assess the standard is by
counterfactually  comparing  to  doxastically  ideal  agents  or  to  doxastically  identical
agents (agents with relevantly perfect beliefs, or the same beliefs as the agent). They
suggest that any other interpretation would be “morally arbitrary” (2009: p.82). This
seems mistaken.
Simons questions why they did not consider what the reasonable actor would have
done in the agent’s shoes (2010:  p.573, n.35).  Cornford suggests that  an alternative
position to assess an agent from would be that of the agent who has “complied with
their  epistemic  duties”  (2010:  p.345).  The  supposed  objections  to  the  use  of  the
reasonable person standard might offer explanations for not considering these ideas.
In a discussion of the reasonable person standard, Sharon Byrd voices the worry that
the standard is too high. She compares the actions of defendants to “pinnacles of virtue”
(2005: p.571). The fictional people the standard refers to are thought too virtuous, to set
too high a threshold to expect all agents to meet. This criticism might seem misplaced,
130 Alternatively, reasonable awareness of society’s values might suffice, but this would once again result
in punishment for beliefs about facts, which Alexander and Ferzan reject. 
110
but Byrd focuses primarily on the role of the reasonable person standard in provocation
defences. As Kamir notes, “courts never, in fact, find that a reasonable person would
have killed when provoked”, so a requirement to act as a reasonable person to use a
provocation defence (even as a partial excuse) would be inappropriate131. 
The major issue found with the reasonable person standard132 seems to be that it is
somehow unfair to hold agents to this standard. Because of varying values or mental
capacities,  some agents may find it  more difficult  to meet  this  standard,  or may be
unable to. However, I shall argue that this misconstrues reasonableness. It is not a lofty
aspiration that can only be met by the elite. It is a broad standard that virtually every
agent133 within a community is able to meet.
Baron  discusses  several  potential  conflations  that  could  result  in  problematic
interpretations  of  “reasonable”,  citing  that  it  is  “often  treated  as  synonymous
with…‘average’,  ‘ordinary’,  ‘law-abiding’,  and  ‘prudent’”  (2013:  p.6).  It  might  be
noted that “ordinary” and “prudent” were used interchangeably with “reasonable” by
Lord  Diplock134.  There  are  many  dangers,  as  well  as  clear  conceptual  faults  of
131 Note that what is inappropriate is the requirement of the agent to act like a reasonable person. As 
Baron argues: “a complete defense should be available only if a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
situation might well have” acted the same way [my emphasis]. For a partial defence, the “requirement can
be that a reasonable person might well have been extremely upset/angered by the provocation…” (2013: 
p.8). It is outwith my remit here to discuss whether provocation should serve as a partial defence, but it is 
clear that if it did, the role of reasonableness must be different.
132 There are also serious concerns in the application of the reasonable person standard. Kamir (2005) 
and Moran (2010) discuss the normalization of the standard, which result in the “reasonable person” 
being construed as male and white, therefore distorting the standard. Baron addresses these concerns in 
“The Standard of the Reasonable Person” (2011), but within this paper I shall simply assume that these 
issues, though certainly problematic and warranting concern, can be resolved. 
133 There may be some agents who, because of mental defects, are unable to reach even this minimal 
standard. This should not, however, count against the use of the standard. As Baron argues, “such 
abnormalities should never constitute a sound basis for lowering the standards to which we hold the 
general population” (2001: p.14). Those who cannot attain reasonableness do warrant (or even require) 
special treatment to be able to function safely in society, but this does not tell us anything about the 
standards others should adhere to.
134 Caldwell, p.354
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identifying “reasonable” as “ordinary”. Holding those of low intelligence or children to
“ordinary” standards, as in Elliott v C and R v G is one such problem. Those particular
problems would not have emerged if the standard concerned was what a reasonable
person might have noticed in the actor’s situation (rather than what was obvious to an
ordinary person). 
Clearly, a reasonable person need not be ordinary, and reasonable conduct need not
be  ordinary.  Baron  notes  that  though  the  concepts  are  different,  what  conduct  is
considered “ordinary” or “customary” can inform what it is reasonable to expect of an
agent. She considers a surgeon charged with negligent homicide (2011: p.28). When
discerning whether or not the defendant was negligent, it might be useful to know what
procedures  are  customary,  or  expected  in  that  situation.  Knowledge of  the  accepted
practice can inform what sort of behaviour deviates from this, and whether a surgeon
might reasonably have made the mistakes the defendant has. 
A conflation with “prudence” can also result in too high a standard being set for
“reasonableness”. This can provide the illusion of reasonableness requiring risk-averse
behaviour,  or  frugality.  It  might  be  perfectly  reasonable  for  an  agent  to  spend  his
savings on a vintage hat at a whim (providing he was under no obligation to spend it in
some other way), but this would certainly not be prudent. Baron notes that “prudence”
also carries with it connotations of “rational self-interestedness”, which could in fact
play against reasonableness (2011: p.28).
In her analysis of what the concept of reasonableness entails, Baron notes that what
is relevant is often the reactive attitude to some situation (2013: p.18). A reasonable
person is not furious over minor inconveniences, does not become profoundly aggrieved
by  a  perceived  minor  slight  and  does  not  blame  those  who  do  not  deserve  it.
Importantly, a reasonable person would not act upon such reactive attitudes. This stage
in between reaction and action gives an agent the opportunity to act reasonably. A hot
tempered person, with the knowledge that he is often disproportionately angered by
small matters may decide to take a deep breath and calm himself. Alternatively, he may
fuel his anger and cause himself to lash out. When there is no good reason to do so,
“stoking one’s anger” seems unreasonable (2013: p.18). 
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Baron  also  notes  that  a  “tendency  to  mistrust  others”,  being  “unwilling  to
compromise”, or “exempting oneself from requirements to which one holds others” are
also clear hallmarks of unreasonableness (2013: pp.19,20,17). Notably not featured on
this list are simple failings of rationality. One can be foolish, as in the case of someone
who  does  not  dress  warmly  in  the  winter,  but  such  an  agent  is  not  described  as
unreasonable (2013: p.24). Neither is the agent who forgets his wallet unreasonable135.
Herein  lies  the  response  to  those  who  argue  that  a  “reasonable  person  standard”
punishes the foolish. Being reasonable does not entail good reasoning. As Baron notes:
“Reasonableness is primarily about how one reacts to others and, more broadly, how
one views others. It calls for fairness, and for awareness of others as people like you
with aims, interests, needs, the right to make claims on others, and bad days. It calls for
tolerance  and  some  modicum  of  cooperation  and  reciprocity.  It  does  not  call  for
moderation in general, but does call for moderation insofar as the moderation is in order
for getting along with others.”
(2013: p.224)
It  might still  be thought that these qualities are too demanding for some agents.
However, these are traits that all agents can cultivate136. Furthermore, these are all traits
that it is important for an agent to have if they are to have successful social relations. It
is also not the case that an agent will have to be perfectly reasonable at all times. Also,
merely  acting  unreasonably  will  not  amount  to  an  offence.  Baron  argues  that
“reasonableness  enters  in  in  a  different  way:  to  limit  the  range,  or  availability,  of
defences” so it isn’t even the case that the law requires an agent to be reasonable (2013:
p.29). 
135 Unless special circumstances apply; perhaps his friends – knowing his tendency to forget – had told 
him several times to write a note to ensure he did not forget, and he stubbornly refused, in which case we 
might describe himself as unreasonable.
136 With the exception of some agents of diminished capacity, who special rules should apply to anyway, 
see supra n.133.
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3. Reasonableness in Duff
The most difficult criticism of Duff’s account mentioned in the previous chapter was
Norrie’s objection that it would be unfair to hold “unenlightened” people to a reasonable
person  standard.  However,  as  the  considerations  of  reasonableness  in  the  previous
section suggest, this isn’t a particularly lofty challenge, nor is it unattainable for vast
proportions of the public.
Because  Duff’s  account  holds  that  acts  manifesting  practical  indifference  are
culpable, and agents’ failures to act reasonably can manifest practical indifference, such
failures  are  clearly  culpable.  Unlike  Alexander  and  Ferzan,  Duff  is  able  to  find
culpability in the absence of a conscious choice, so a conscious choice to act recklessly
is not necessary.
Norrie might question what justifies holding agents accountable for failing to act
reasonably or form reasonable beliefs. This is justified when the agents have committed
a wrong that damages the interests we value highly enough to legally protect. To prevent
the interests of society from being compromised, the law can at least demand the fairly
minimal criteria required by reasonableness.
Alexander and Ferzan’s account of culpability attempts to focus on criminalising
insufficient  concern.  However,  it  fails  to  appreciate  that  harms  resulting  from
insufficient  concern  may  occur  as  a  result  of  agents  failing  to  make  reasonable
inferences. The apparent lack of dependence upon standards of reasonableness was the
only argument that counted in favour of Alexander and Ferzan in the previous chapter.
However,  it  now seems that  reliance on some standard of  reasonableness  is  neither
problematic, nor avoided by their account.
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Conclusion
The current formal account of recklessness in UK criminal law fails to properly capture
culpability distinctions. The abandonment of Caldwell recklessness, though necessary,
leaves  various  actions  deemed non-reckless  and consequently non-culpable.  Though
special steps have been taken to criminalise the conduct in some of these cases – as in
the 2003 Sexual Offences Act – such remedies treat the symptoms rather than the cause
of  the  erroneous  verdicts.  When  the  principles  that  govern  culpability  judgements
themselves  are  properly  considered,  as  in  the  two  contemporary  accounts  of
recklessness  provided,  what  is  required  for  culpability for  a  given offence  becomes
more clear.
In comparison to the revolutionary rival account of Alexander and Ferzan, Duff’s
coheres much more readily with everyday moral intuitions. In addition, the concepts of
opaque recklessness and genetic recklessness would be extraordinarily difficult to put
into  practice,  whereas  Duff’s  own  account  simplifies  several  aspects  of  current
proceedings. 
When  Duff’s  account  of  recklessness  as  practical  indifference  is  evaluated,
satisfactory responses are available to all the problem cases. Perhaps most impressive is
its ability to appropriately account for the culpability of the rapist who without good
reason believes in consent. The requirements for a defence in such a case fall out of the
theory,  needing no ad hoc treatment. Similarly,  the role is clear for jurisprudence to
discern which offences, like rape, essentially entail practical indifference upon the part
of an agent. Accordingly, this can aid in formulation of what may or may not count as a
defence. Once what will exculpate or mitigate for a given offence is known, this can
help in providing jury instructions tailored to a given offence. While the question of
“whether  an  agent’s  conduct  manifested  a  practical  indifference  on  the  part  of  the
defendant” might prove overly complicated to the layman, “did the defendant have good
reason to believe x?” is comprehensible to anyone. 
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